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The Consequences of Disparate Policing:
Evaluating Stop-and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing
Aziz Z. Huq

*

[forthcoming, 100 Minnesota Law Review – (2017)]
Abstract
Beginning in the 1990s, police departments in major American cities started
aggressively deploying pedestrian stops and frisks in response to escalating
violent crime rates. Today, high-volume use of “stop, question and frisk,” or
“SQF,” is an acute point of friction between urban police and minority residents.
In numerous cities, recent consent decrees or settlements have imposed Fourth
Amendment and Equal Protections constraints on police. But do these
constitutional rules adequately respond to the harms of SQF? This Article argues
that the core moral objection to SQF does not track the Constitution’s focus upon
the evidentiary sufficiency of stops or the racial animus of individual officers. I
develop instead a new account of the distinctive wrong of aggressive street
policing that is not contingent on individual animus or fault. This alternative
account turns on the manner in which such policing can reproduce social and
racial stratification. To substantiate this, I present a detailed analysis of the costs
and benefits of SQF, with careful attention to its ecological spillovers and
dynamic, intergenerational effects. Having explained why constitutional law,
given its narrow transactional frame, is disarmed from an effective response, I
present the alternative lens that is constitutionally and legally available for
diagnosing harmful forms of urban street policing. This draws from the disparate
impact framework of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and certain states’ laws.
While an imprecise fit, disparate impact is legally feasible and readily available.
To show that it is workable, I sketch three lines of econometric analysis capable
of identifying an especially troubling subclass of racial disparate impacts in
urban street policing.

*

. Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Disclosure: I am on the
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Introduction
Beginning in the 1990s, police departments in major American cities started aggressively
deploying pedestrian stops and body searches in response to escalating violent crime rates.1 The
programmatic deployment of “stop and frisk” or “stop, question and frisk” (“SQF”) in New
York,2 Chicago,3 Philadelphia,4 and other major cities5 involved large numbers of street stops
and frisks, often concentrated in a handful of minority neighborhoods. Given the volume of
individuals stopped, SQF likely became the modal form of police-citizen contact for some
residents. Between May and August 2014, for example, police in Chicago stopped more than
250,000 people—which translates as 93.6 stops per 1,000 inhabitants.6 In Philadelphia, police
have stopped between 215,000 and 253,000 people per year since 2009.7 In Baltimore, the
Department of Justice estimates, roughly 412,000 people were stopped in 2013.8 At its peak in
2011, New York’s SQF policy generated more than 685,724 stops per year.9 Between 2004 and
2013, that city’s inhabitants experienced roughly five million street stops.10
Given the sheer scale of this intrusion into citizens’ daily lives, it is hardly surprising that
SQF would provoke sharp controversy. Sharp-elbowed debate has ensued as to whether AfricanAmericans and Hispanics are being inappropriately stopped and searched. 11 In addition to
catalyzing a wider national argument about race and policing,12 SQF has sparked large-scale
public protests,13 mayoral campaigns,14 threats to sue,15 and litigation itself. In the wake of legal
1

Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 337 (2014)
[hereinafter “Meares, Law and Social Science”]
2
Id. at 337; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing early
history of SQF in new York City).
3
Elliott Ramos, Poor data keeps Chicago's stop and frisk hidden from scrutiny, WBEZ.org (Sept. 12, 2013)
http://www.wbez.org/news/poor-data-keeps-chicagos-stop-and-frisk-hidden-scrutiny-108670 (describing use of stop
and frisk in Chicago, but noting absence of sound record-keeping).
4
See, e.g., Erica Goode, Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, with Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at A11.
5
Laird Harrison, Oakland Police Consultant Defends ‘Stop, Ask and Frisk,’ KQED NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013, 9:38
AM), http:// blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/02/25/oakland-police-consultant-defends-stop-ask-and-frisk. (discussing
SQF policies in Los Angeles and Oakland).
6
ACLU of Illinois, Stop and Frisk in Chicago 11 (March 2015), http://www.aclu-il.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf [hereinafter “Stop and Frisk in Chicago”]. Because many
individuals were stopped more than once, the effect of the policy was even more concentrated.
7
David Abrams, The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 378 (2014).
8
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Division, Investigation of Baltimore City Police Department 23 (Aug, 10, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download.
9
N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union, Stop-and-Frisk 2012, at 3 (2013), available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf.
10
Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015).
11
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of
Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309, 312-14 (Stephen K. Rice
& Michael D. White eds., 2010) (documenting disparities in stops in the New York context); Stop and Frisk in
Chicago, supra note 6, at 11 (same for Chicago).
12
For a snapshot of that debate, see Julie Bloom et al., Baton Rouge Shooting Jolts a Nation on Edge, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 18, 2016, at A1.
13
John Leland & Colin Moynihan, Thousands March Silently to Protest Stop-and-Frisk Policies, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2012, at A15.
14
Khorri Atkinson, Mayor de Blasio to Reform Stop-and-Frisk, AMSTERDAM NEWS, Feb. 6, 2014, 12:50 AM, http://
amsterdamnews.com/news/2014/feb/06/mayor-de-blasio-reform-stop-and-frisk/.
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challenges, settlements or consent decrees regulating the use of street stops have been reached in
the past few years in several cities. In the last year or so, New York,16 Chicago,17 Philadelphia,18
Cincinnati 19 , New Orleans, 20 Seattle, 21 Baltimore, 22 Cleveland, 23 and Newark 24 all have all
entered into such decrees. Two cities, Boston and Oakland, did not wait for litigation, but
engaged expert consultants, who in both cases isolated evidence of racial discrimination in street
policing.25
The debate over SQF is heated in part because of disagreement about how the core moral
wrong of intensive street policing (if one exists) should be conceived. The legal framework
employed by many of the aforementioned settlements and consent decrees is modeled on a body
of black-letter constitutional doctrine that is relentlessly focused on the motivations and beliefs
of specific, individual officers. For example, in New York, the case of Floyd v New York (which
has yielded the only judicial decision on SQF) focused first on the Supreme Court’s 1968
decision Terry v. Ohio, which held that officers need “reasonable articulable suspicion” of
criminality to make a nonconsensual street-stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment.26 Then,
citing the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, the Floyd court
held that plaintiffs had to show that SQF not only had a racially disparate effect, but had been

15

Aamer Madhani, Chicago police and ACLU agree to stop-and-frisk safeguards, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2015,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/07/chicago-police-agree-reform-stop-and-frisk/31277041/.
16
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (appointing a monitor and ordering broad
systemic equitable relief).
17
Investigatory Stop and Protective Pat Down Settlement Agreement, Aug, 5, 2015, http://www.aclu-il.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-06-Investigatory-Stop-and-Protective-Pat-Down-Settlement-Agreeme.pdf
[hereinafter “Chicago settlement”].
18
Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree at 4-5, Bailey v. Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952
(E.D. Pa. 2010), http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/744/198/ [hereinafter “Philadelphia Settlement”]
19
In re Cincinnati Policing, No.-C-1-99-317 (April 11, 2002) (on file with author); see also In re Cincinnati
Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 400 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (affirming settlement).
20
United States v. City of New Orleans, Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, 2-12-cv01924-SM-JCW (E.D. La. July 24, 2012) [hereinafter “New Orleans Decree”] (on file with author); United States v.
City of New Orleans, 947 F. Supp. 2d 601, 614 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 731 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming consent
decree).
21
United States v. City of Seattle, Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, No. 12CV-1282 (W.D. Wa July 27, 2012) [hereinafter “Seattle settlement”] (on file with author); see also Mahoney v.
Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (describing settlement process).
22
Agreement in Principle Between The United States and the City of Baltimore Regarding the Baltimore City Police
Department, Aug. 10, 2-16, https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883376/download [hereinafter “Baltimore
Agreement”].
23
Josh Saul, America has a Stop and Frisk Problem: Just Look at Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK, May 18, 2016,
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/10/stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police-460951.html
24
Id.
25
Strategies for Change: Research Initiatives and Recommendations To Improve Police-Community Relations in
Oakland, Calif., (Jennifer L. Eberhardt, ed. June 20, 2016), https://sparq.stanford.edu/opd-reports [hereinafter
“Oakland report”]; “Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study
Results,” Oct 8, 2014, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/boston-police-commissioner-announces-fieldinterrogation-and-observation-fio-study-results (reporting some racial disparities in both stops and frisks).
26
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
(1968). Separately, the Fourth Amendment requires that an officer “reasonably suspect that the person stopped is
armed and dangerous” before conducting a protective pat-down, or frisk. Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
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adopted “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” certain
racial groups.27
Other consent decrees and settlements are also crafted in the shadow of Terry and
Feeney. The Seattle settlement is typical in commanding that the police department adopt a
street-stop policy that “explicitly conform[s] to constitutional requirements, that officers be
annually trained on “Fourth Amendment and related law,” and that patrolling police act “free of
unlawful bias.”28 Similarly, the Philadelphia settlement condemns “stops, frisks, or searches …
made without the requisite reasonable suspicion” and envisages “policies and practices to ensure
that stops and frisks are not conducted on the basis of the race or ethnic origin of the suspect,
except where the law permits race or ethnic origin to be considered.”29 This individualist blackletter doctrine means that even absent litigation to a final judgment, courts and legal reform
efforts have a narrow focus on discrete, interpersonal transactions. Similarly, the dominant
economic model of racial bias in policing focuses on the identification of taste-based
discrimination over and above statistical discrimination. 30
This Article argues that SQF presents a normative challenge that is not well captured by
the individualistic lens of Terry or Feeney, or the economic literature’s focus on taste-based
discrimination. The distinctive moral harm of SQF does not turn on racial animus per Feeney, or
weak evidentiary predicates per Terry (although both might exist on the ground). It does not arise
within the narrow, individualist “transactional frame” that currently dominates both law and
economics.31
SQF today is defined by its large scale and “group-based” application.32 Its distinctive
moral wrong is inextricably related to this programmatic quality, not the happenstance of
individual officers’ motives.33 The core of this wrong is structural. Accordingly, the welfarist
analysis I propose in Part I is focused on the large-scale, programmatic use of SQF as obserbed
in New York Chicago, and Philadelphia; I have no cavil with the retail use of Terry stops as an
element of nonprogrammatic street policing. When operationalized at a large scale, however.
SQF is a key link in the reproduction of social and racial stratification, typically with large
regressive distributional effects and surprisingly little value-added as a crime control measure.
27

Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (citing Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
Seattle settlement, supra note 21, at ¶¶ 140, 142 & 145.
29
Philadelphia settlement, supra note 18, at 1 & 5.
30
John Knowles, Nicola Persico, & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109
J. POL. ECON. 203, 205 (2001).
31
Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1313 (2002)
(“Constitutional cases, like common-law ones, are typically conceptualized as discrete transactions in which
government inflicts harm on some individual by making her worse off relative to some baseline position or, under
equality rules, relative to some reference individual or group.”).
32
Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 821
(2011) (offering this description of New York City’s policy). The dominant “individualism” of Equal Protection
jurisprudence has long been subject to decisive and devastating critique. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107, 127 (1976).
33
I use the term “moral wrong” to signal that my argument is not centrally normative, and not legal in nature. My
analysis, presented in Part II, is consequentialist in nature. It is my view that the range of relevant consequences for
an evaluation of public policy is capacious, and not limited to narrowly drawn monetizable harms. Recognizing the
normative nature of any effort to identify salient costs and benefits, I flag in my analysis those costs or benefits that
rest on a potentially contestable moral judgment.
28
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More specifically, SQF should be understood as a historically situated innovation that responds
to late twentieth-century urban pathologies in a way that perpetuates those pathologies. The call
for SQF arose in important measure because local and state governments had helped foster
minority neighborhoods entrenched in concentrated poverty and suffering from high violentcrime rates. Rather than addressing those underlying conditions, local and state policy-makers
elected to respond with a policy that has limited crime-control benefits but large negative
spillovers on disadvantaged neighborhoods. Viewed in a dynamic perspective, SQF catalyzes an
entangled set of individual and neighborhood-level harms. Through mutually reinforcing
interactions, these various harms reinforce the social and racial stratification that initially set the
stage for massive street policing expenditures. Without a clear grasp of this ecological and
dynamic context, current remedial interventions are likely go astray.
If in response to such ecological and dynamic dimensions, constitutional law is disarmed.
Some other tool is needed. Consistent with a growing body of scholarship that resists the narrow
transactional frame of current constitutional doctrine34 and the dominant doctrinal focus on
individual officials’ fault,35 I argue that our current doctrinal models for capturing the harms of
aggressive policing are woefully inadequate. Instead, we need a more structural and capacious
legal framework to encapsulate the core moral objections to SQF.
An alternative, more promising legal framework is a version of the disparate impact
standard familiar from the employment discrimination36 and fair housing contexts.37 A disparateimpact framework is better able to account for the evidentiary problems involved in accounting
for the diverse forms of discrimination manifested in a complex system characterized by a high
decree of diffused discretion.38 It is by no means perfect. It does not provide a proxy for the
thorough evaluation of both costs and benefits presented in this Article. Rather, disparate impact
isolates a subset of problematic cases in which SQF’s heavy burden is asymmetrically positioned
on minority communities, and demands a robust justification from the state for that potentially
regressive, subordinating, and demoralizing situation. In this regard, it is better placed than either
Fourth Amendment or Equal Protection doctrine to resist the exacerbation of racial hierarchies.39
No theory of liability, however, will be a comprehensive panacea to a complex and entrenched
phenomenon like concentrated, racialized poverty. Disparate impact liability for SQF captures
S

See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2049, 2051, 2057 (2016) (criticizing “criminal courts’ transactional myopia” and their lack of “a holistic
picture of how the criminal justice system operates”).
35
See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies. 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2015)
(arguing that “the Court has developed a gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional remedies”);
Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
670, 706 (2011) (same).
36
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (“[A] complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.”); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (allowing disparate
impact under the 1964 version of Title VII). A disparate-impact theory of liability is also available under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005.
37
Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015)
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) & 3605(a) to permit disparate impact liability).
38
Cf. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 520-23
(2003) (discussing the evidentiary use of disparate impact liability).
39
Id. at 523-24.
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the instances in which the moral wrong of SQF is at its acme, and helps ensures that policing
responses make matters no worse.
Disparate impact liability is overlooked because it has not been part of Equal Protection
doctrine since the early 1970s.40 Because of the Constitution-centered focus of much scholarship,
it is easy to forget it is available. But a disparate-impact standard is available under both federal
statutes that regulate local police departments41 and also (in California42 and Illinois43) state law.
The Chicago settlement and the New Orleans settlement invoke some of these disparate-impact
rules as guiding authorizations. 44 Nevertheless, neither elaborates upon their bare-bone
references. As a result, the analytic and practical advantages of a disparate-impact lens for police
remain underappreciated. The theoretical questions raised by its translation to the policing
context also remain poorly understood.
My final aim, therefore, is to show how disparate impact can serve as a lens for analyzing
street policing in practice. To that end, I consider how disparate racial impacts might be sifted
from the granular policing data increasing being collected by large police departments as a result
of settlements and consent decrees.45 Specifically I sketch three tractable empirical strategies for
identifying disparate impact in street stop-related policies. First, deployment-related disparities
between beats or districts within a jurisdiction can be measured to ascertain whether a
muncipality’s overall distribution of policing resources can be justified on race-neutral
grounds.46 Second, within a given beat or district, disparities in how stops are allocated among
different ethnic and racial groups can be evaluated.47 Finally, at the level of given officers,
40

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional Solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). Prior to Davis, disparate impact was an important element of the
constitutional doctrine in this domain. Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-16
(2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Divided”] (collecting cases).
41
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations apply to police departments that receive
federal funds. 42 U.S.C. §2000d “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”); see also 28 C.F.R. §41.101 et seq. (implementing
regulations). The Safe Streets Act also prohibits local police action with a racially disparate impact. 42 U.S.C.A. §
3789d (“No person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under or denied employment in
connection with any programs or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available under this chapter.”);
see also 28 C.F.R. §42.203 (implementing regulations).
42
West’s Ann. Cal. Gov. Code §11135; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, §§ 98101(c) & (i).
43
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 23/5 (a)(1).
44
Chicago Settlement, supra note 17, at 6; New Orleans settlement, supra note 19, at 2.
45
David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 853, 863 (2013).
46
On the role of larger policy in shaping street-level outcomes, Shannon Portillo & Danielle S. Rudes, Construction
of Justice at the Street Level, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 321, 331 (2014) (“When police routinize stop and frisk
policies, and … ration services, attempt to control uncertainty, husband worker resources, and manage consequences
of routines, they do so within the confines of existing policy.”).
47
Precinct or beat-level effects can be captured through multilevel modeling techniques in which data on stops is
structured so that individual racial groups are nested within precincts. For examples of this approach, see Expert
Report of Dr. Jeffrey Fagan at 40, Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), available at
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf [hereinafter “Fagan Report”];
Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's “Stop and
Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 813, 817-18 (2007).
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disparities in the quantum of suspicion deployed for whites and nonwhites can be assessed by a
range of tools.48 By aggregating and contrasting disparities at different levels, the empirical
toolkit I sketch enables a better understanding of the causes and extent of SQF’s disparate
impact. That understanding in turn can serve as a foundation for more targeted, less disruptive,
and more effective equitable remedial interventions.
These empirical approaches, moreover, enable disparate impact’s translation to the
policing context while avoiding the constitutional and practical problems encountered in the
employment discrimination context. For each empirical approach posited, I therefore consider
the range of exculpatory justifications that might be offered to diffuse a prima facie finding of
racial disparity.49 I further respond to weaknesses apparent from disparate impact’s application to
other contexts. In the employment discrimination context, for example, there has been
disagreement about how to identify business justifications that can justify racial disparities,50 and
the magnitude of ultimate disparities required for liability.51 The use of disparate impact in the
employment context has also generated worries about the doctrine’s constitutionality52 and its
efficacy in promoting structural policy change.53 In translating disparate impact to the policing
context, I consider and reject each of these reasons as a reason for abandoning the translation.
The possibility of disparate impact as a template for rethinking urban policing has yet to
be explored in any detail, although an earlier article by David Sklansky and colleagues touches
on the question.54 But my analysis aligns with penetrating work by Tracey Meares, Jeffrey
Fagan, and Amanda Geller, all of whom emphasize that SQF is a distinctive mode of urban
policing that cannot be analyzed in terms of discrete interactions, because “programmatic stops
are imposed from the top down” at a massive scale.55 Furthermore I echo Richard Bank’s worry
48

Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao, & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding racial Disparities in New York
City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 100 Ann. App. Stat. 365); see also Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police
Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, -- NEW CRIM L. REV. --, at 5 (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://5harad.com/papers/policing-the-police.pdf.
49
See Abrams, supra note 7, at 375 (discussing potential justifications).
50
The availability of employer justifications has been the subject of dispute both on the Supreme Court and in
Congress. Compare Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (describing a relatively lenient
standard for business justifications, with id. at 671-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a more demanding
standard); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring that an employer “demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”); Michael
Selmi, The Supreme Court's Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 281, 287-89 (2011) (describing disagreements legislators and President George H.W. Bush on this topic).
51
On disputes over the threshold disparity for liability, see Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact
Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 573 (1991) (noting that “four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for
the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence,” but also
collecting dissenting views).
52
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate impact and
equal protection will be waged sooner or later [so] … “it behooves us now to begin thinking about how--and on
what terms--to make peace between them.”).
53
Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory A Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 706 (2006) (noting that
“disparate impact theory has produced less change than typically assumed”); accord George Rutherglen, Abolition
in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (1992).
54
Sharad Goel et al. Combatting Police Discrimination in an Age of Big Data, -- NEW CRIM. L.
REV. – (forthcoming 2016).
55
Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk As A Program,
Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162-63 (2015) [hereinafter “Meares, Programming Errors”]; Fagan &
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about the “potential inadequacy as a policy framework” of much constitutional doctrine,”
although my diagnosis and response differ from his.56 By contrast, my analysis diverges sharply
from the large literature on “racial profiling,”57 which more narrowly focuses on intentional
animus or the purposive use of race as a criterion in enforcement decisions.58 My approach does
not focus on individual fault or bad intent. Instead, my concern is with the interaction between a
specific kind of common policing strategy and larger social dynamics of racial segmentation and
stratification.59
The argument proceeds in three steps. In Part I, I provide a thick, empirically robust
account of SQF as a distinctive modality of urban policing highlighting the dynamic negative
effects of SQF upon minority communities in concentrated urban poverty. Part II turns to the
constitutional doctrine developed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause to regulate such policing. Using Terry and Feeney as focal points, I demonstrate that
constitutional doctrine systematically fails to account for the harms that flow from SQF. The gap
reveals inconsistencies and internal contradictions within the doctrine. Having rejected the
default framework for legal analysis of SQF, I sketch in Part III an alternative lens of disparate
impact. Concluding, I illustrate three empirical strategies that might be used to determine
whether remedial intervention is warranted. In so doing, I hope to show that disparate impact is a
practicable and plausible approach for courts and other supervisory bodies.
I.

The Costs and Benefits of Stop-and-Frisk Policing

To evaluate stop-and-frisk as a way of eliciting public order requires an understanding of
its costs and benefits in historical and social context. This Part therefore first offers a definition
of SQF as a historically situated strategy employed by urban police forces, and then develops a
careful tally of its pros and cons. Some courts have analyzed SQF in terms of costs while
Geller, supra note 10, at 61 (“Stop-and-frisk as envisioned by the Terry Court was largely a set of distinct “retail”
transactions, characterized by individualization, material or visual indicia, and specificity. But the current
“wholesale” practice is quite different from the vision of the Terry Court.”).
56
R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 574 (2003).
57
Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical
Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 n.2 (2015) (collecting the large legal
scholarly literature on racial profiling).
58
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the
Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 664-65 (2002) (“As we use the term, “racial profiling” occurs when a law
enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer
believes that members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit
the sort of crime the officer is investigating.”; Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002) (using the term “racial profiling” to mean police action taken “because the
officer believes that members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to
commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating”); R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and
Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2001) (focusing on the use of
“[s]uspect description reliance, like racial profiling, [as] both useful and racially discriminatory.”). Outside the legal
academy, racial profiling is also defined in criminological, economic, and normative terms. Robin S. Engel, A
Critique of the ‘Outcome Test’ in Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUST. Q. 1, 6 (2008) (summarizing different
approaches). My analysis of SQF overlaps with Engel’s “economic” and “normative models. Id.
59
The “disparate impact” analysis defines its central analytic focus in terms of “purposeful” discrimination, rather
than differential effects. J. Mitchell Pickerill, Clayton Mosher & Travis Pratt, Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling,
and Traffic Stops: A Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL'Y 1.5 (2009). This is not how the term is used in
the legal scholarship, and I do not follow that definition.
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bracketing benefits.60 I disagree with this approach. Appreciation of the distinctive wrong of
SQF demands a comprehensive understanding of justifications, criticisms, but also benefits, all
nested in a ecological and dynamic context.
A.

Defining Stop and Frisk (“SQF”)

Stop, question, and frisk, or SQF, is an urban policing measure that involves the largescale deployment of officers in public spaces (e.g., sidewalks, alleys, the communal outdoor
spaces of public housing) tasked with conducting frequent investigative stops. Under a line of
cases beginning with Terry v. Ohio,61 an officer is entitled to make a “brief” nonconsensual
“investigatory stop” if she has “reasonable articulable suspicion” that a crime either has occurred
or is about to occur.62 Separately, if the officer has a further reasonable articulable suspicion that
the person stopped is “armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,’ she may
conducted a “limited protective search” for weapons.63 Reasonable articulable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause, but still requires “a minimal level of objective
justification”64 In addition to a stop and a frisk, officers may take further actions ranging from a
verbal caution or a citation, or an arrest. Arrests vary widely in character. They might be
discretionary or mandatory.65 They may be based on conduct or evidence discovered by the
officer during the stop, or they might be predicated on an outstanding warrant revealed when a
person’s name is cross-referenced with state, local, or federal databases.
The jurisprudence of Terry stops and frisks relentlessly focuses on discrete transactions
between specific officers and specific defendants. But this is misleading.66 SQF is a policy that
operates at scale. Not tens or hundreds of individuals but tens or hundreds of thousands are
arrested over the course of months. In New York, for example, there were 313,047 documented
stops in 2004 and 576,394 stops in 2009.67 In Philadelphia, a city with one-fifth New York’s
population, there were more than 200,000 stops each of the last three years, despite the existence

60

See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) “(This Court's mandate is solely to
judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool....”).
61
392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court did not provide the canonical formulation of the Fourth Amendment standard,
but instead more ambiguously asked whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?’” Id. at 21-22.
62
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). The earliest use of the phrase “reasonable, articulable suspicion” is
twelve years after Terry in Brown v. Texas, and in that context is an (unattributed) quotation from the state’s brief.
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The phrase is used as law of the case first in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983)
63
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).
64
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
65
The standard view in criminology is that arrests are a highly discretionary decision because they are dispersed,
somewhat aleatory in timing, and hence hard to supervise. Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 408 (2005); accord Eisha Jain, Arrests
As Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 817 (2015). Even where law imposes a duty on officers to make an arrest
(e.g., in domestic violence cases), officers as a practical matter maintain a measure of discretion as to what to do.
66
Meares, Programming Errors, supra note 55, at 175.
67
Fagan Expert Report, supra note 47, at 18-19; see also supra text accompanying notes 6 to 10 (citing stop rates in
New York and Chicago).
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of a court-supervised consent decree.68 The analysis in this section is focused on SQF as
deployed en masse.
SQF has similarities to, and can overlap somewhat with, the strategy of “broken
windows” or “quality of life” policing.69 But the tactics are distinct. Whereas broken windows
policing relies on arrests “to remove undesirable persons from a neighborhood,”70 SQF tends to
involve a relatively low rate of arrests.71 SQF tends to be a direct response to violent crime, and
not a prophylactic response to the possibility that the sight of “broken windows” will induce
escalating forms of disorder.72
One more detail is essential to my functional definition of SQF: Within a city, SQF is
typically employed with greatest intensity on a small subset of neighborhoods.73 Typically, its
deployment is highest in neighborhoods characterized by “concentrated poverty” where crime
rates tend to be higher than in other parts of the city.74 In Chicago, for example, one study of
stops in 2014 found 266 people per 1,000 in the African-American neighborhood of Englewood
and 43 per 1,000 in the white neighborhood of Lincoln/Foster. 75 SQF also tends to be
concentrated upon minority—i.e., African-American and Hispanic--neighborhoods. Hence, the
district court in Floyd found that the racial composition of a neighborhood was a better predictor
of the density of stops than its lagged crime rate.76 And at the height of New York’s SQF, an
African-American resident of New York City had a 92 percent chance of being stopped in a
single year period.77 SQF, in short, is not just a high-frequency policing strategy, it is also a
highly geographically concentrated one in minority (African-American and Hispanic)

68

Plaintiffs’ fifth report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, in United States v. Bailey, No. 10-5952,
at 20 (2015), https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/2230/198/.
69
Amanda Geller, The Process Is Still the Punishment: Low-Level Arrests in the Broken Windows Era, 37 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1025, 1029 (2016) (distinguishing the two approaches); accord Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship
Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City "Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1504
(2014).
70
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic (Mar.
1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465.
71
Geller, supra note 69, at 1032 (noting, based on New York data, that “relatively few street stops lead to arrest”).
That said, “broken windows” policing, and a concomitant rise in the rate of arrests tends to be geographically
collocated with SQF.
72
See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 70. A decisive critique is offered in BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 166-80 (2001).
73
David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New
York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength? The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a
Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129 (2014) (finding that a majority of stops in New York occurred at just 5
percent of intersections).
74
For empirical evidence, see Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Macrostructural Analyses of Race, Ethnicity,
and Violent Crime: Recent Lessons and New Directions for Research, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 347-52 (2005);
Ronald C. Kramer, Poverty, Inequality, and Youth Violence, 567 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 123, 124-25
(2000).
75
Stop and Frisk in Chicago, supra note 6, at 9.
76
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Fagan Expert Report, supra note 47, at 34 (explaining neighborhood differences).
77
AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 41 (2014).
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neighborhoods. So even if it entails a low rate of arrest, it is likely that SQF at least contributes
to the exceeding high rates of minority arrest in the United States.78
In sum, SQF is best understood as the large-scale use of Terry stops in predominantly
black and Hispanic urban neighborhoods in response to violent crime. Its architects are
cognizant, and embrace, this racial symmetry.79 But rather than dwelling on whether their views
should be ranked as invidious discrimination, I engage in a more consequentialist inquiry: I
consider the gains and the harms from SQF. These, I contend, must be understood in light of
geographic and historical context to be appreciated properly. It is the benefits of SQF that I focus
upon first, before considering costs.
B.

The Crime-Control Benefits of SQF in Context

1.

The Case for SQF

Aggressive use of street stops at a high volume has a long historical pedigree.80 By 1969,
they had become so endemic that the Kerner Commission, established by President Johnson to
investigate the 1967 urban riots, singled out excessive investigate stop, and the “wholesale
harassment by certain elements of the police community of which minority groups, particularly
Negros, frequently complain.”81 Today’s fires are echoes of yesterday’s conflagrations.
SQF in its modern form is a direct response to an uptick of violent crime in the 1980s
collocated with what William Julius Wilson called the persistence of “ghetto poverty.”82 The
78

In expectation, about forty-nine percent of black men and forty-four percent of Latino men will be arrested by age
twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60
CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).
79
See, e.g., Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Commissioner Kelly Says Almost 75% of Violent Crime Committed by
African-Americans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 2, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/commissioner-kellydefends-stop-and-frisk-targeting-african-americans-article-1.1332840#ixzz2UiHaXcKt; Azi Paybarah, Ray Kelly:
By the Department’s Count African-Americans are Being Understopped, POLITICO, May 2, 2013,
http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2013/05/ray-kelly-by-the-departments-count-africanamericans-are-being-understopped-000000; Ray Kelly, The NYPD: Guilty of Saving 7,383 Lives, WALL ST. J., July
22, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324448104578616333588719320; see also Heather
McDonald, How to Increase the Crime Rate Nationwide, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324063304578525850909628878 (defending racially disparate
street policing on the ground that “the preponderance of crime perpetrators, and victims, in New York are also
minorities”).
80
The earliest programmatic use of SQF I have been able to identify occurred in Cincinnati’s Avondale
neighborhood in 1958. Alex Elkins, The Origins of Stop-and-Frisk, JACOBIN, May 2015. It was subsequently used in
cities such as San Francisco in the 1960s. CHRISTOPHER LOWEN AGEE, THE STREETS OF SAN FRANCISCO: POLICING
AND THE CREATION OF A COSMOPOLITAN LIBERAL POLITICS, 1950-1972, at 35-39 (2014). During most of the
twentieth century, however the use of street patrols was in the decline. Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban
Policing, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 554 (1992). Up to the 1960s, policing as “primarily reactive,” an orientation
modified by the rise of community policing. James J, Willis, A Recent History of Police, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING (Michael D. Reisig & Robert J. Kane, eds. 2014). A 1966 study of Chicago
police, for example, found they spent one percent of their time actively stopping point, 14 percent reacting to the
public’s calls, and 85 percent on unstructured random patrols. Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based
Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42 CRIM & JUST. 377, 378 (2013).
81
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 143-44, 302-03 (1968).
82
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 12 (1996).
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political sponsors of the policy consistently identified violent crime control as its core aim.83
Because violent crime is disproportionately committed by African-Americans, and concentrated
in black neighborhood, they argued, it is no surprise that SQF focuses on those predominantly
minority neighborhoods. Rather than proof of anti-minority animus, the use of SQF is on this
view evidence that police are exerting special efforts to protect minorities from crime. The
persuasive force of this argument from crime-control is the subject of this section, while the tally
of SQF’s costs is addressed in the following section.
The genesis of this argument for SQF’s benefits traced back to the early 1990s. In 1994,
the sociologist James Q. Wilson published an influential opinion piece in the New York Times
entitled “Just Take Away their Guns,” which captured the distinctive appeal of SQF.84 Wilson
argued for the aggressive use of Terry stops as a means to “reduce the number of people who
carry guns unlawfully, especially in places -- on streets, in taverns -- where the mere presence of
a gun can increase the hazards we all face.”85 His call responded directly to a very real crisis of
law and order. At the time, New York City was suffering from a high homicide rate.86 Of the
1951 murders that occurred in New York in 1993, the year ending as Wilson wrote, more than
1,500 were committed by firearm.87
Wilson’s call for aggressive street policing as a prophylaxis for gun voice found a
measure of empirical support the following year. In 1995, the criminologist Lawrence Sherman
and colleagues published the results of a quasi-experiment conducted for 29 weeks in Kansas
City of gun-based, intensive street-policing, and found an astonishing 49 percent decline in gun
crimes without any spillover to neighboring areas.88
Results of this kind prompted “[s]everal cities to “rush[] to follow the Kansas City model
…”89 by seizing upon SQF as a tool for lowering violent crime rates. The earliest adopter of
SQF, New York City, seems to have begun aggressive use of Terry stops (as distinct from
‘broken windows’ policing) around 1994. A parallel aggressive use of stops in Philadelphia came
to public attention in 2000, after a scandal involving hundreds of unlawful arrests, searches, and
prosecutions in the 39th Police District led to the disclosure of incident reports showing a high
rate of illegal stops.90 In the early 1990s, constitutional litigation over Chicago’s ‘gang loitering’
ordinance in part hinged on the 42,000 stops executed under that measure over three years.91 The
83

Leo Eisenstein & Laura Gottesdiener, Why Michael Bloomberg is Wrong About Stop-and-Frisk, ROLLING STONE,
May 22, 2013, http:// www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-michael-bloomberg-is-wrong-about-stop-and-frisk20130522 (“Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray Kelly have dismissed these concerns,
claiming that stop-and-frisk has dramatically reduced the city's murder rate.”).
84
James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1994.
85
Id.
86
Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder, 39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 531, 534 (1999).
87
Id. at 534-35.
88
Lawrence W. Sherman & D.P. Rogan, Effects of gun seizures on gun violence: “Hot spots” patrols in Kansas
City, 12 JUST. Q. 445, 445-73 (1995).
89
Meares, Law and Social Science, supra note 1, at 340; Bellin, supra note 69, at 1505 (“[T]he NYPD uses stop and
frisk to find guns and deter gun-carrying ….”).
90
Complaint in Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952, at ¶¶ 83-84 (E.D. Pa. 2010),
https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/669/198/.
91
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49 (1999). Ten years earlier, another class action alleged that Chicago
police would improperly “arrest, … charge and … detain … persons for disorderly conduct … with no intent to
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Chicago Police Department’s limited collection of information about its stops and frisks meant
that it was not until 2015 that data emerged showing that the city’s SQF intensity had exceeded
its usage patterns of the 1990s (and, incidentally, also overshot New York City’s stop rates).92
Crucially, the policing strategy endorsed by Wilson, and implicitly supported by the
Kansas City evidence, does not lend itself to uniform application across entire cities. Violent
crime in urban contexts has long been closely correlated with a subset of geographic areas
typically characterized by concentrated poverty.93 In turn, concentrated urban poverty, both in
the 1990s and today, is not evenly spread across racial ethnic groups. Rather, it is a
disproportionately minority phenomenon.94 Not only impoverished African-Americans, but also
black middle-class cohorts are disproportionately represented in extremely poor urban
neighborhoods.95 One side effect of this is that urban violent crime impacts minority groups
more grievously than non-minority groups.96 In 1993, the year before Wilson wrote, the AfricanAmerican homicide victimization rate per 100,000 population was 47.0, while the white rate was
6.4.97 From the perspective of its political sponsors, SQF has to train upon African-American and
Hispanic neighborhoods not because of some theory of race and crime, but because that is where
the murders—the murders of minority citizens—are happening.98
If American cities were in progress toward meaningful racial integration, this nexus
between policing and race might be expected to have waned by today. But despite increasing

prosecute such charges in court.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 104 F.R.D. 404, 404 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 1000,000
people were arrested in these operations. Stop and Frisk in Chicago, supra note 6, at 5.
92
Stop and Frisk in Chicago, supra note 6, at 6, 10.
93
There is an enormous empirical literature to this effect. A useful summary is Janet J. Lauritzen & Robert J.
Sampson, Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 58, 65-70
(Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Peterson & Krivo, supra note 78, at 347-52; Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W.
Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI.
918, 923-24 (1997).
94
See Glenn Firebaugh and Chad R. Farrell, Still Large, but Narrowing: The Sizable Decline in Racial
Neighborhood Inequality in Metropolitan America, 1980–2010, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 139 (2016) (analyzing data from
1980 to 2010, and finding that “greater concentration of blacks and Hispanics in poorer-than-average
neighborhoods” in urban contexts); see also ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE
ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012) (describing racial character of concentrated poverty in Chicago). For the
correlations between poverty, crime, and racial segregation, see Edward S. Shihadeh & Nicole Flynn, Segregation
and Crime: The Effect of Black Social Isolation on the Rates of Black Urban Violence, 74 Soc. Forces 1325, 1345
(1996) (finding that “segregation is a major predictor of the rates of homicide and robbery among blacks”).
95
Lincoln Quillian, Segregation and Poverty Concentration: The Role of Three Segregations, 77 AM. SOC. REV.
354, 354-55 (2012) (finding that black poverty concentration stems from the complex interaction of racial
segregation, poverty-status segregation within race, and segregation of blacks from high- and middle-income
members of other racial groups).
96
Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 474 (2000) (“In urban areas, many poor people of color live in conditions of residential
segregation, concentrated poverty, and unemployment that predict the breakdown of community social processes,
which in turn predict elevated crime rates.” (footnote omitted)).
97
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 10 fig.1.5 (2007).
98
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing defendant’s argument
that “the apparently disproportionate stopping of blacks and Hispanics can be explained on race-neutral grounds by
police deployment to high crime areas, and by racial differences in crime rates”).
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ethnic and racial diversity within cities, urban racial segregation endures.99 As many American
cities today are as “hypersegregated” today as were in 1970.100 The experience of residential
segregation moreover, has remained especially stable for African-Americans regardless of
class. The proportion of African-American areas lacking racial diversity “remained stubbornly
set at around 8.6 percent” throughout the 1990s. 101 Even “relatively advantaged” black
neighborhoods “continue to be unique in the degree to which they are spatially linked with
communities of severe concentrated disadvantage.”102
The argument in favor of SQF, in short, rests on its ability to mitigate the costs of violent
crime particularly associated with urban minority-dominated neighborhoods. To the extent that
areas of concentrated poverty persist in cities, and to the extent they are predominantly black or
Hispanic, SQF might even be viewed as a form of affirmative action. It is a positive subsidy to
impoverished minority communities, a surplus provision of the public good of policing. In
former New York police commissioner Ray Kelly’s words, the real problem with urban policing
is then that “African-Americans are being understopped” in light of the violent crime
experienced by black communities.103
2.

The Difficulties of SQF as Violent Crime Control

The benefits of SQF, however, are more qualified than its advocates suggest. I focus here
on how those benefits are properly characterized before turning to the policy’s costs. Focusing
solely upon SQF’s suppression of violent crime, there are both reasons for skepticism of the
magnitude of the ensuing benefit, and grounds for treating the benefits as morally problematic.
These concerns, I stress, bear on SQF’s efficacy, not the moral urgency of addressing the
hecatomb of contemporary urban homicide.
I highlight four grounds for concern. First, the evidence for an absolute crime-control
effect from SQF is surprisingly fragile. Second, the evidence of a marginal effect from SQF in
comparison to other methods is nonexistent. What evidence exists suggests many of the crimecontrol benefits of SQF might be obtained without its aggregate, racially disparate aspect. Third,
and relatedly, the claim that SQF disproportionately benefits African-Americans rests on
complex and controversial assumptions. Finally, even assuming firm evidence of large crimecontrol gains from SQF, there is a normative objection to the state taking credit for those benefits
99

See John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults, & Reynolds Farley, Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades
of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY, 1, 7 (2004) (finding that despite modest declines in racial segregation, blacks remain
“substantially more” segregated from whites than Hispanics or Asians).
100
Douglas S. Massey and Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in Black Hypersegregation, 23
DEMOGRAPHY 1025, 1027 (2015).
101
Steven R. Holloway, Richard Wright & Mark Ellis, The Racially Fragmented City? Neighborhood Racial
Segregation and Diversity Jointly Considered, 64 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 63, 69-70 (2012).
102
Patrick Sharkey, Spatial segmentation and the black middle class, 119 AM. J. SOC. 903, 905-06 (2014).
103
See sources cited in supra note 79. For scholarly defenses of SQF and its effect on violent crime, see, e.g., David
Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 117, 141 (2013) (describing Rosenthal’s endorsement of SQF on public safety grounds); Bellin, supra note
69, at 1538 (“[A] high volume of arbitrary frisks is essential to effectively deterring gun possession”). Bellin’s
position, however, is more nuanced and careful than Rosenthal’s concludes that SQF is not narrowly tailored as
required by the application of strict scrutiny under Equal Protection doctrine. Bellin, supra note 69, at 1546.
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when the governmental entities responsible for SQF also contributed to minority segregation into
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.
First, notwithstanding Sherman’s Kansas City study, “it is very difficult to connect [SQF]
to any crime reduction.” 104 Two subsequent efforts at replicating the former study, in
Indianapolis and Pittsburgh, have produced ambivalent results.105 The Indianapolis study, for
example, found that homicide rates decreased in one of two treatment areas, but remained
unchanged in the other.106 Its authors concluded that the “present state of knowledge does not
allow us to answer the theoretical questions of what produced the effects in Kansas City.”107 A
meta-analysis of six policing experiments involving increased police patrols in North and South
America reexamined the Pittsburgh data, and suggested that while the study had found a
statistically significant reduction in gun violence, alternative specifications “strongly sugges[t]
the estimated drop in shots-fired incidents was due at least in part to a preintervention trend, a
seasonal pattern, or chance.”108 Nevertheless, the authors of the meta-study found themselves
ultimately “generally favorable” to the method pioneered in Kansas City, but raised concerns
about whether the results of Sherman’s experiment could be scaled up beyond the level of
smaller neighborhoods.109
In an operational context, SQF fares less well. Rigorous empirical studies of SQF’s post1994 deployment are rare. Existing results, though, provide sparse support for its crime-control
effects. For example, a study of the effects of SQF on burglary and robbery rates in New York
between 2003 and 2010 found “few significant effects.”110 Another quantitative study of New
York found that “the number of shooting incidents was virtually unchanged during the years in
which stops and frisks grew at an extraordinary rate,” suggesting that it was “extremely unlikely
that these stops could have reduced the homicide rate by reducing gun ownership or carrying.”111
The most detailed and comprehensive study of overall trends in recent crime rates in New York,
by Franklin Zimring, also concluded that in the New York City context, “there is no way to
separately measure the value added by aggressive intervention in New York City.”112 Zimring
himself seems of two minds about SQF. On the one hand, he identifies “aggressive[e]” measures
such as hot-spot policing, the elimination of open-air drug markets, and firearm reduction as
104

Meares, Law and Social Science, supra note 1, at 345.
CHARLES EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS
DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 32-33 (2014) (describing and discussing both studies).
106
Edmund F. McGarrell, Steven Chermal, & Alexander Weiss, Reducing Firearms Violence through Directed
Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 119, 143-44 (2001).
107
Id. at 145.
108
Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police crackdowns on illegal gun carrying: A systemic review of
their impact on gun crime, 2 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 227, 245-46 (2006).
109
Id. at 248-49.
110
Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in
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“probably” successful. 113 On the other hand, he is more confident that “data driven crime
mapping and patrol strategy management” and the hiring of police officers did likely have large
and negative effects on crime rates.114 At the very best, Zimring’s evidence leaves open the
possibility that SQF had some role to play in crime reduction. It casts no light on the magnitude
of that role, or whether the same gains in public order might have been achieved through
alternate means.
Another potential means of examining SQF’s impact is to examine the aftermath of the
policy’s unexpected discontinuance. But there has also been no detailed study of what happened
after the New York City Police Department reduced the number of stops dramatically in 2013. In
the three years after that decline began, however, murder rates have remained “essentially
flat.”115 In Chicago, a more complicated story obtains. A sharp rise in murder and decline in
arrests followed the December 2015 release of long-suppressed video footage of a fatal police
shooting provoked sharp public outcry against Chicago Police Department 116 Immediately
thereafter, in January 2016, changes to how stops and frisks are recorded—but no change to
operational policy—went into effect. Given that the highly critical public reaction to the video
likely had a significant effect on multiple aspects of police behavior, it is hard to disentangle any
discrete effect from changes in SQF policy.
The empirical case for a crime-control benefit from SQF, in short, does not stand on
strong foundations.117 The weakness of its evidentiary predicate contrasts with strong evidence
for other kinds of reform, including the deployment of more officers and the use of more datadriven approaches. While there is some empirical support for an effect in small-scale
experiments (although the degree of such support has been challenged118), there is no existing
evidence that this effect can be replicated at a citywide level. More than forty years after
Wilson’s initial intervention, therefore, SQF remains largely predicated on a well-intentioned
guess about the effect of intensive street stops on violent crime levels.
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Second, econometric studies of SQF’s effect on crime of the kind discussed above aim to
isolate the marginal effect of the policy after controlling for all other relevant variables. In effect,
they hold all else constant and then search for an effect of SQF on crime rates. But the
assumption that ‘all else remains constant’ is an obvious artifice. A police force that foregoes
SQF is likely to employ an alternative policing strategy that does not involve nonconsensual
interventions or facially racial disparities in treatment. The marginal negative effect on crimecontrol of shifting from SQF to an alternative modality of policing is likely to be smaller than the
absolute effect of simply foregoing SQF entirely. A police force that chooses to forego SQF can
redeploy the substantial personnel resources it demands for other uses.
There are, moreover, other modalities of policing that are positively associated with
crime control in rigorous empirical studies. Consider, for example, the robust empirical literature
on “hot-spot policing,” a technique that has some parallels with SQF, but can be distinguished.
Hot-spot policing involves “the application of police interventions at very small geographic units
of analysis.”119 An impressive range of studies and meta-studies has demonstrated that the highly
localized deployment of officers has a meaningful and statistically significant effect on crime
rates.120
Hot-spot policing and SQF have some similarities, but their differences are critical. First,
there is a question of scale. SQF (as I use the term) involves tens or hundreds of thousands of
arrests. Hot-spot policing does not require similarly massive deployments. Hence, the one study
of an existing SQF policy to consider the question concluded that deployments tended to occur
across areas that were too large to be characterized as “hot spots” as that term is technically
used.121 Hence, even if the distinction in scale between SQF and hot-spot policing is hard to
quantify, in practice it seems easy enough to draw.122 Second, hot-spot policing does not require
stops, let alone frisks or arrests as a central element. There is evidence that “increased police
presence alone” dampens crime rates, but the “strongest” impact is associated with “situational
prevention” strategies, which “disrupt situational dynamics that allow crime to occur,” for
example by “razing abandoned buildings.”123 One study of street stops at “microgeographic” hot
spots examined in one week increments in New York generated reductions in crime, but
119
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cautioned that “evidence suggests that crime prevention can be achieved without resorting to an
unrestricted SQF policy.” 124 In this New York data, moreover, SQF was pursued “at the
expense” of other strategies, leaving open questions about the “potential of other policing
strategies.”125
Hot spot policing plainly requires more officers. It is important to emphasize that my
argument here solely concerns the style of policing, and not the sheer volume of officers
deployed. 126 But increasing stops or arrests, by contrast, do not appear to be a necessary
component of hot-spot policing. Indeed, in one leading study, the authors noted approvingly that
officers in the treatment condition (i.e., engaged in hot-spot policing) were not evaluated on their
stop count, but rather were held “accountable for reducing citizen calls for service and for
ameliorating social and physical incivilities in targeted hot-spot areas.” 127 A recent
metaanalysis of 19 studies of hot-spot policing separately examined the effects of two distinct
versions of that policy that involved either increasing the volume of traditional policing or using
a problem-solving approach.128 Three of eight studies or the traditional policing model found
small positive effects on crime reduction. But the overall mean effect size of problem-oriented
hot spot policing was twice the effect size of the traditional policing model.129 It would seem that
the choice to simply increase traditional policing activities at hot spots is dominated in practice
by problem-solving measures.
The contrast between SQF and hot-spot policing usefully underscore a more general
point: Policing is not a single, undifferentiated public good. Rather, policing takes several forms,
pursuing diverse ends of crime-control, order-maintenance, and social provision, with divergent
tools.130 Police forces now engaged in SQF have at other times, employed other, quite different
approaches, which focus instead on service provision131 or community relations132 as well as
prophylactic street policing. Some of these policies aim to reduce crime; others, such as
community policing, seek to “build[] a reservoir of public support” to tap in moments of
strain.133 These different services can be bundled in different ways. In at least some of the
jurisdictions in which SQF is employed, neighborhoods subject to aggressive street policing do

124
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not necessarily receive high levels of other policing services. 134 In Chicago, for example,
African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods are subject to SQF on the one hand, but on the
other hand experience substantially longer delays than nonminority neighborhoods when seeking
police aid via 911 calls. 135 Policing is thus both under-supplied and over-provided
simultaneously.
Defenders of SQF therefore may well mislead when they equate SQF with a police force
“focus[ing] its resources where people most need protection.” 136 Rather, it is both possible—and
in fact often seems to be the case—that SQF is accompanied by serious deficiencies in other
parts of the bundle of police services. Estimation of the margin costs of ending SQF must
therefore account for the possibility of variance across these other elements of the police
function.

Third, the assumption of SQF’s advocates, particular in New York, has been that its
benefits accrue to the minority residents of high crime neighborhoods more than they accrue
to residents of low-crime neighborhoods.137 It is this assumption that might point toward a
profitable comparison between SQF and affirmative action: Both are policies that
disproportionately benefit African-American and Hispanic minorities. But consider another
possibility: Since the 1960s, the fear of crime has been a concern that has powerfully
mobilized white electorates.138 It may be that among the gains of SQF is a reduction in the
fear of crime,139 and that this gain is diffused among the wider urban population. The latter,
of course, is typically much larger than the urban subpopulation subject to SQF.
Even assuming there is a substantial marginal crime-control gain in substituting SQF
for the next-best policy,140 it is necessarily the case that whereas (predominantly minority)
residents of impoverished neighborhoods experience both costs and benefits, whereas
(predominantly white) non-residents of other neighborhoods experience only benefits (albeit
in expectation at a much lower rate). There are also likely to be many more white nonresidents of targeted areas than minority non-residents. The former benefit from being able to
access more of the city—a benefit that the latter do not obtain—as well as from a reduced
fear of crime. Depending on the magnitude of these various costs and benefits for different
racial groups, it is quite possible that the adoption of SQF might create larger net benefits for
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the class of white nonresidents as a whole than for the class of minority residents of highly
policed neighborhoods—even without accounting for the potential costs of SQF.141
The claim that SQF disproportionately benefits minorities is an important part of the
moral case in favor of the policy. Closer examination of the assumptions underlying the
claim, however, uncovers its fragility. It is hardly clear that—even bracketing the costs of
SQF—it is true that a disproportionate share of the social benefits of SQF run to minority
communities. Much depends on the welfare effects from crime reductions and from
mitigation of crime-related fears.
The fourth and final reason for skepticism of the positive case for SQF based on its
crime-control effects is not based on empirical data or calculations of welfarist
consequences. Rather, it is moral in nature, and depends on a distinctive and likely
controversial moral logic: the idea that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud,
or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to
acquire property by his own crime.”142 Applying that concededly raw intuition to the case of
SQF reveals the following line of argument: The problem of violent crime to which SQF
responds flows from the existence of neighborhoods of concentrated (and racialized) poverty.
Although there are many forces molding the latter, governmental actors at the state and local
level have a large share of responsibility. Those same governmental bodies (if not the exact same
politicians143) also adopted SQF. Having exposed minority communities to the harm of high
violent crime rates, governmental bodies cannot then “take advantage” of this wrong to seek a
measure of legal and policy leeway that they otherwise would not have. At a minimum, they
should elect the policing strategy that imposes the minimum burden on minority communities
that as a result of persisting state policy have been subjected to concentrated poverty and high
crime rates.
The threshold premise of this argument—that states and localities bear a measure of
responsibility for concentrated, minority poverty—has substantial support in the historical and
empirical literature. To be sure, “macrostructural” forces such as the deindustrialization of
central cities and the exit of some middle-class and wealth African-Americans have driven the
growth of concentrated, racialized poverty. 144 But these forces have been magnified by
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“deliberate policy decisions to concentrate minorities and the poor in public housing.”145 In
Chicago, for example, alderman and the mayor thwarted efforts from the 1940s onward to
disperse African-Americans outside traditionally black neighborhoods.146 Across the country,
zoning restrictions and permitting requirements have been extensively deployed to perpetuate
racially “exclusionary” residential patterns.147
The implications of state involvement in the creation of concentrated racialized poverty
depend on the sort of moral fault one attributes to a collective entity such as a municipality, the
precise mix of state action and private actions responsible for residential segregation, and the
extent to which any historical responsibility is mitigated by the passage of time and the burdens
that remediation would impose on innocent third-parties.148 I do not aim to resolve that complex
suite of questions here. Rather, my more limited claim is that a city’s claims on behalf of SQF
must at a minimum be contextualized by its historical responsibility for the burdens imposed by
concentrated poverty, particularly on the racial minorities whose efforts to move beyond that
condition in search of employment and educational opportunities have so often been thwarted.149
At an absolute minimum, it would seem appropriate to demand a heightened burden of proof for
claims about the benefits of disparate crime-control measures tendered by the very entity
responsible for racial segregation. At a minimum, the institutional author of racial segregation
should do no further harm to minorities when it addresses the costs of such segregation. Having
created the problem that SQF is intended to address, municipalities have no entitlement to a
benefit of empirical doubt. More ambitiously, cities’ partial culpability for the underlying
condition of concentrated poverty might justify special efforts to ensure that no policy response
to crime imposed a disproportionate share of costs on the legatees of historical discrimination, or
that denied them a disproportionate share of its benefits.
*

*

*

This section has examined the crime-control benefits of SQF. The evidence for those is
surprisingly fragile. The case for thinking SQF has marginal benefits in comparison to a next145

Sampson & Wilson, supra note 144, at 43; see generally Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial
Inequality Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 625, 649-51
(2011) (analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial residential segregation in the
suburbs and urban cities).. Such policies also existed at the federal level. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). For a recent accounting in the
legal scholarship, see Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical
Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1955–56 (2015) (discussing the role of the Federal Housing
Authority in fostering urban racial segregation).
146
See ARNOLD HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940-1960, at 23-24, 6468, 222-23 (1983) (discussing political resistance to the diffusion of public housing, motivated by opposition to
racial integration); accord D. BRADFORD HUNT, BLUEPRINT FOR DISASTER: THE UNRAVELING OF CHICAGO PUBLIC
HOUSING 85-86 (2009). Private violence also played a large role in Chicago. HIRSCH, supra, at 217-18.
147
See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial
Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888-89 (2006); Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting
Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 166773 (2013).
148
An additional complication arises if a municipality that adopts SQF simultaneously pursues policies that either
entrench or preserve concentrated minority poverty.
149
On the difficulty of African-American exit from concentrated poverty via economic improvement, see MARY
PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 24-27 (1999).

- 20 -

best policy option such as hot-spot policing is even more shaky. Accounting for the fear of
crime, moreover, suggests that defenses of SQF as a form of affirmative action may well fail.
Finally, an analysis based on the state’s historical responsibilities for the underlying conditions
that motivate SQF suggests a need to view the state’s celebration of the policy’s benefits with a
measure of skepticism.
C.

The Ecological and Dynamic Costs of SQF

This section turns from SQF’s putative benefits to its costs. In my view, SQF has an
intertwined set of individual and collective costs that largely (but not exclusively) sound in an
equality-related rather than a Fourth Amendment register. My starting assumption is that SQF’s
costs, no less than its benefits, cannot be understood detached from the historical origins of
concentrated poverty. Nor can they be evaluated without thinking carefully about the ways in
which SQF might perpetuate the underlying conditions of social and racial stratification into
concentrated poverty. In short, rather than analyzing racial discrimination as a “single-point
outcome,” I endorse the dominant emphasis in recent sociological scholarship on “modeling
discrimination as a process” 150 rather than a discrete action or outcome.
I identify eight pathways by which SQF can impose harms on individuals and
communities defined by race. I began my analysis of costs by focusing on the immediate
encounter between police and an individual. Having documented costs in that context, I then
widen my lens to capture a diverse array of adverse spillovers from that immediate encounter,
not only to the individual, but also for his or her social network, and (for racial minorities) his or
her larger racial cohort. The latter effects of SQF, it should be noted, diffuse through social
networks and families.151 Several critically depend upon “vicious circles”, or positive feedback
mechanisms that entangle individual and neighborhood-level effects,152 often with regressive
distributive consequences. More generally, it is plausible to view all eight causal pathways as
intertwined and, to an extent, mutually reinforcing.
First, the Supreme Court in Terry recognized that even brief stops and frisks have
immediate and substantial costs. Chief Justice Warren described even a temporary police stop as
“a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.”153 In subsequent cases, however, the
Court has tended to downplay the direct psychological and dignitary costs of being stopped.154
But ethnographic data and qualitative studies demonstrate that Chief Justice Warren’s
initial intuition was correct. The immediate toll of a nonconsensual police intrusion—even
absent physical content or formal consequence—is quite substantial. Perhaps the best evidence
150
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derives from a recent survey of 1,200 young men in New York. This found that contact with the
police (primarily in the form of Terry stops) was consistently associated with persisting “stigma,
trauma, anxiety and depression.”155 On reflection, it should be no surprise that these effects flow
from a Terry stop. The latter is an unexpected encounter with heavily armed police, typically
characterized by a sense of utter helplessness and s sharp fear of violence and deadly force.156
This fear may be amplified by a worry of more prolonged detention, a real concern in a
jurisdiction where police have arrest quotas to fill.157 This psychological toll is not immediately
visible. It may be shameful even to admit. These are, perhaps, the least troubling explanations for
why such costs have largely fallen out of judicial accounts of SQF.
Second, a different, racial asymmetry afflicts judicial consideration of the risks of bodily
harm attendant on a Terry stop. On the one hand, the Court has punctiliously attended to the risk
of bodily harm to officers during a stop.158 On the other hand, the Court has been largely silent
about the possibility that Terry stops expose the individual subject to police attention to a
substantial risk of physical violence.159 Nor has it accounted for the possibility that these risks
will be positively correlated with minority status. Recent empirical work by Roland Fryer using
the Terry stop-related records of New York’s police found “large racial differences” in police use
of “non-lethal force,” including slapping, grabbing, and pushing individuals into a wall or onto
the ground.160 Even assuming perfectly compliant behavior, African-Americans were 21 percent
more likely to experience force than whites.161 Given such large differentials in the use of force,
it would hardly be surprising if a large proportion of the innocent minority residents of highcrime neighborhood who are stopped and frisked objected to aggressive SQF even if it had
public safety benefits that diffused to their benefit.162
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Third, the effects of Terry stops on the individuals directly subject to police attention do
not expire when their participants part ways. Rather, negative experiences with the police breed
cynicism about the law, an unwillingness to invoke the police’s aid, and a diminished proclivity
to comply with the law or cooperate with legal authorities. The connections between negative
police treatment and strongly aversive views of the police are empirically well grounded, albeit
not in contexts where SQF has been implemented.163 But studies from the specific cities at issue
here demonstrate vividly that both intensive street policing has lingering effects on the
dispositions and beliefs of the population at issue.
For instance, a recent qualitative study of young men living in three high-crime
neighborhoods in Philadelphia found that less than 10 percent were willing to call the police “in
any circumstances,” in part because many had themselves had negative experiences with the
police in the past.164 Tellingly, the same study also found resentment directed at police because
of their failure to respond to 911 calls in a timely fashion.165 Police, that is, not seen reflexively
in a negative light: It is intrusive and disrespectful treatment, coupled with a failure to provide
noncoercive public-safety, that elicit negative perceptions of the police. This study, however,
focused on negative experiences of police, rather than the mere fact of being stopped. Although
the Philadelphia study suggests that young men in particular perceive police contact generally as
negative, it does not test for different effects of any police contact.166 In contrast, a recent study
in New York, examining young subjects in areas affected by SQF, found that increasing
experience of stops (whether negative or positive experiences) diminished perceptions of police
legitimacy. 167 A larger body of empirical findings from the United States and beyond
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demonstrates that diminished police legitimacy is associated with a diminished disposition to
follow the law and a lesser willingness to cooperate with police.168
Relatedly, a high volume of stops concentrated in a specific geographically locale can
create a vicious-circle feedback loop that works from individual legal cynicism to increased
collective victimization, and back again. When SQF is perceived as being distributed on racial
grounds (perhaps because African-Americans and Hispanics are in fact at a much greater a risk
of being stopped than whites169), cynicism about the law and police is likely to be sharpened in
minority communities. At the margin, violations of the law become more frequent.170 As the
expected risk of being victimized rises, therefore, it seems that residents of heavily policed areas
become less willing to proactively reach out to police. This further lowers the expected cost of
criminality, rather than alleviating it as SQF’s advocates hoped.171 More crime in turn leads to
more aggressive SQF, which starts the cycle anew. A version of this dynamic has been termed
the “Ferguson effect,” a term that captures the possibility that high-visibility instances of police
misconduct lead to increases in crime because of reduced confidence in police or because of
increased risk-averseness on police’s part. Evidence for the Ferguson effect, however, is weak
and confined to certain crimes in certain cities.172 If further evidence were to emerge of such an
effect, it would nevertheless strength the argument developed here.
Fourth is another vicious circle related to legal cynicism: If minorities have consistently
negative views of the police, and respond to stops accordingly, police may come to anticipate
more resistance from those minorities. Shared police expectations of a greater risk of AfricanAmerican violence in response to a police stop is one potential explanation for the higher rates of
force for black suspects that Fryer finds in the New York SQF data.173 Appearances, in this way,
influence realities. 174 The perception of racial disproportionality in stops hence influences
individual residents’ behavior, which in the aggregate creates racial differences in violence by
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police. This of course merely strengthens minorities’ negative expectations of police.175 Hence,
large racial disparities in the physical harms associated with SQF can be reconciled with the
“nearly uniform support for the principle of equal treatment” found in polling data.176
Fifth, just as legal cynicism leads to higher victimization rates, so too can the carceral
consequences of SQF. “[M]ore punitive police enforcement and parole surveillance” leads to a
higher frequency of repeat admissions from a given neighborhood, which “begets more
incarceration,” which in turn begets more crime.177 To the extent SQF does not result in arrests,
of course, this dynamic is blunted.
Sixth, SQF might solidify stereotypical assumptions about the correlation of race and
criminality. Where the neighborhoods targeted for SQF are predominantly African-American
and Hispanic, SQF is likely to strength the widely shared perception of a connection between
race and crime.178 Careful empirical studies have demonstrated that the racial identity of a
neighborhood’s inhabitants already provides a cue for people’s estimates of its disorderly
character179 and its crime rate.180 SQF, especially when explicitly justified on the basis of black
criminality, works as an official imprimatur upon this popular stereotype. And by instantiating
state policy on the basis of that spurious correlation, it deepens and ratifies racial stereotypes that
long predate any known disparity in crime rates, and that depend not on empirics, but rather on
profound (and invidious) assumptions about racial differences.181 Empirical evidence already
suggests that suspects with darker skin pigmentation are likely to identified as criminal182 and
punished more severely183 than similarly situated lighter-toned suspects. It may also be that the
tighter perceived correlation between race and criminality reinforces residential segregation, by
“mark[ing] off ‘black’ from ‘white’ neighborhoods.”184
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Seventh, another probable (if untested) effect of SQF is a dampening of civil participation
by residents of affected neighborhoods in ways that, over time, conduce to diminished collective
political power. Important recent work has demonstrated empirically that contact with the
criminal justice system, including nonconsensual stops, has a substantial and statistically
significant effect on trust in government.185 In one national sample, “[t]he probability of voting
declined by 8 percent for those who have been stopped.”186 Once again, there is a potent vicious
circle in operation here: SQF is a form of policing that allocates most of its costs to minorities
living in concentrated poverty. But the downstream effect of a high stop rate is that roughly one
in ten of those subjected to SQF become less likely to vote. Like felon disenfranchisement laws,
SQF thus has the effect of sapping low-income minority communities’ influence on public policy
and distributions of public goods,187 even as it purports to empower those communities.
Eighth, and finally is yet another potential aggregate effect—this time upon the level of
“collective efficacy” within a neighborhood. Developed by the Harvard sociologist Robert
Sampson, the concept of collective efficacy involves “the linkage of mutual trust and the shared
willingness to intervene.”188 In repeated studies, high levels of collective efficacy have been
found to boost “neighborhoods[’ ability] to realize the common values of residents and maintain
effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood variation in violence” and in
particular homicide.189 Although there is no study of the effect of SQF on levels of collective
efficacy, there is little reason to think it will be positive. If contact with the police breeds legal
cynicism, intracommunal violence, anxiety, and an unwillingness to engage politically, it is hard
to see how it could foster collective efficacy. If that is so, SQF suppresses a key determinant of
public safety within neighborhoods.
Many of these eight effects likely endure across generations. Most impoverished AfricanAmerican youth, as well as a “significant” proportion of middle-income ones, live in urban
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty of the kind subject to SQF.190 SQF is pivotal in the
formation of many minority children’s understandings of their status and possibilities in
America, an effect that is compounded because one in four black children already experiences
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parental incarceration.191 To think that SQF’s structural harms will be transient, therefore, is
rather optimistic.
This is a long list. Its items, though, should not be viewed in isolation. All of these
pathways generate costs concentrated on the minority individuals and communities in which
SQF is imposed. Impoverished minority individuals, and through them their communities,
become more demoralized, alienated, anxious, crime-ridden, and politically powerless. The net
effect of SQF’s eight costs, therefore, is singular: It is to maintain and even deepen social and
geographic schisms that separate neighborhoods and racial groups. SQF therefore cannot be
understood as merely an individual-level intervention. It sets in motion a range of important
social processes, largely detrimental to the shared interests of a neighborhood and a racial group,
in ways that reiterate and recapitulate extant racial and social hierarchies.
These dynamics, finally, may help explain the surprising lack of empirical evidence of
crime reduction from SQF.192 At an aggregate level, communities subject to SQF are likely to
see their political efficacy, their collective efficacy, and their shared commitment to the law
wither. One effect of these changes is an expected increase in levels of crime. This may offset
whatever gains the direct application of SQF achieves partially or in full. SQF, in short, is a
short-term panacea that in the medium-term may well prove self-defeating.
D.

The Distinctive Moral Wrong of SQF

This Part has provided a definition and analysis of the positives and negatives of SQF
with the aim of refashioning the case against SQF. Rather than cabining the inquiry by imposing
artificial constitutional categories at the threshold, I have identified both individual and
neighborhood-level costs and benefits. With both positives and negatives in hand, it is possible to
recapitulate the argument against SQF in a more nuanced and acute form. To be sure, in the
absence of precise quantification of both costs and benefits, that argument necessarily has a
provisional aspect. I have no proof that the policy’s costs exceed its benefits. Nevertheless, I
view the weakness of benefit-related evidence and the accumulation of cost-related evidence as
sufficiently clear to suggest that a working account of the distinctive moral wrong of SQF is
feasible.
The core of the case against SQF is dynamic and ecological in character. It rests on the
policy’s effect not just on the specific persons stopped by policy, but on the dynamic role that
SQF plays in the social and racial stratifications concatenated with urban residential segregation.
It is an argument, moreover, that proceeds without making any assumption of racial animus or
individual officer fault.
In the early 1990s, SQF was adopted as a response to rising violent crime associated with
minority-dominated neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty. In that respect, it was
at its origin a response to an unexpected externality from the urban residential segregation that
had been promoted by state actors from World War II onward. Local and state officials might
191
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have taken another path. 193 From the 1960s onwards, historian Elizabeth Hinton has
demonstrated, national and local politics gradually “blended opportunity, development, and
training programs of the War on Poverty with the surveillance, patrol, and detention programs of
the War on Crime.”194 By the 1980s, however, the War on Crime “would completely supplant”
Great Society antipoverty programs as a solution to urban discontent.195 Noncoercive solutions,
in short, had already been tabled by the time the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s
was in full flush.196 Nevertheless, the policy response to that crime-wave has had ironically
limited crime-control related payoff, while at the same time ratifying racial stereotypes,
emasculating minority communities politically, and exacerbating their social and political
weaknesses. Especially given the backdrop of municipal policies that consciously enabled and
entrenched the urban ghetto, this policy choice was a morally problematic one: It was, in effect a
choice by the state to exacerbate a form of racial stratification for which the state itself bears
large moral (if not constitutional) responsibility.
On this account, SQF is one link in a larger “process”197 of social and racial stratification
in ways that extend well beyond the discrete effects of an isolated encounter between one officer
and one resident.198 Given its exiguous benefits (shared by society) and its multifarious costs
(largely concentrated within already impoverished minority communities), it is hard to imagine
that SQF would have anything but regressive distributive effects as between racial groups.199 On
the assumption that my judgments about the relative magnitude of costs and benefits are
sustained, I believe that SQF can fairly be characterized as “a systematic and institutional
phenomenon that reproduces racial inequality and the presumption of black and brown
criminality.”200
Given this characterization, I resist claims that the problem of race in policing is a
distraction, and that it would be better to focus reforming energies on (say) the problem of mass
incarceration 201 or structural inequality. 202 SQF—even absent any racial animus—cannot be
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separated from larger processes of subordination along social and racial lines, and efforts to
distinguish the two phenomena are deeply misguided. Equally beside the point are claims that
SQF is based on an accurate generalization about racial minorities’ criminality. 203 Such
background regularities are themselves functions of state action (given the state’s role in
perpetuating racialized concentrated poverty, which is in turn correlated with crime). A policy
choice that reinforces rather than dissipates the force of that generalization is hardly entitled to
deference based on its putative accuracy.204
A legal remedy might not be able to capture all of the diverse causal pathways I have
identified here. But a legal remedy should nonetheless respond in part to SQF’s distinctive moral
wrong by identifying those instances of policing choice that have the least positive effect on
security with the largest stratification related spillovers. It is this question of the aptitude of
constitutional doctrine and its subconstitutional counterpart in disparate-impact law to which I
now turn.
II.

Street Policing and the Limits of Constitutional Doctrine

This Part turns to the core doctrines of constitutional law invoked and applied in
challenges to SQF—the Fourth Amendment law associated with Terry and the Equal Protection
Clause doctrine that coalesces around Feeney. I argue that there is a mismatch between these
doctrinal vehicles and the core normative challenge posed by SQF, as articulated in Part I, which
renders them ill-suited to accounting for the normative challenges of SQF. Thinking about the
costs and benefits of SQF in terms of Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection law reveals a
troublingly asymmetrical gap cutting across both doctrinal structures: Fourth Amendment law
and Equal Protection law alike employ narrow transactional frames to tally the costs imposed by
state action to traditionally subordinate minorities, but are periodically open to dynamic and
ecological effects in ways that serve to obscure or exculpate harms to racial minorities.
To see the mismatch between current constitutional doctrine and SQF programs in a
nutshell, consider a simple hypothetical. Imagine a police force in which every officer had
internalized both Terry and Feeney. Each officer, in consequence, understood that she could not
make a nonconsensual street stop without the relevant reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminality, and that she could not make that stop “because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’”205 the
perceived racial identity of the individual to be stopped. What would change in the actual
practice of SQF? Would the concerns about the volume and racial disparities in stops be
assuaged? The short answer is probably not. Consistent with the weak Terry rule, it may well be
possible for a police force to conduct a very large volume of stops. And consistent with Feeney,
those stops might be constitutional valid even if they were distributed in a way that deepens
131, 145 (2004). My argument here is aimed at showing this claim of separation, however, plausible in their
hypothesized framework, does not hold in the world, and that the benefits of eliminating SQF would not (as they put
it) be “comparatively modest.” Id. at 149. Similarly it is not the case that “African American communities … incur
short-term costs while benefiting in the long run” from SQF. Id. at 163.
203
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racial stratification. Indeed, racial disparities are particularly likely to persist if police believe
that African-Americans commit a disproportionate share of offenses and thus merit a higher percapita rate of street stops. The application of conventional constitutional doctrine under the
Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, is consistent with preservation of
SQF at its present volume and as characterized by current racial disparities.
I consider first the Fourth Amendment and then Equal Protection doctrine, in each case
emphasizing the parallel gaps revealed by their application to the problem of street policing.
A.

The Limits of Fourth Amendment Doctrine

The Fourth Amendment law of street stops cannot impose a meaningful constraint upon
SQF in minority neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty. To the contrary, Fourth
Amendment doctrine systematically lowers the cost of such stops in comparison to others
conducted outside the distinctive urban ecologies of SQF. To the extent that the Fourth
Amendment law of street policing takes account of changing social and institutional contexts,
though, it is thoroughly asymmetrically.
The “reasonable articulable suspicion” predicates for a Terry stop and a related frisk are
not demanding hurdles. They focus solely on the evidentiary predicate for a stop, and ignore the
manner in which a stop is conducted. Terry, that is, takes no account of variance in the potential
dignitary and demoralization externalities imposed by aggressive or demeaning police behavior.
Moreover, the Court has not defined “reasonable articulable suspicion” beyond warning that an
officer must be able to articulate something more than a “hunch.”206 The Court has rather
underscored that this evaluation be made under the “totality of the circumstances.”207 This gives
officers a wide an array of predicate facts to choose from when making their case. With one
exception, officers’ subjective beliefs and knowledge are hence available as bases for a Terry
stop,208 even though such subjective factors are not relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis
in other cases.209 The exception is also telling: Even where race is the real (i.e., subjective) basis
of the stop, the Fourth Amendment provides no remedy where alternative factual grounds for
reasonable articulable suspicion exist.210
Quite apart from this peculiar gerrymandering of the legally relevant grounds for
evaluating the quality of a stop, officers’ discretion is rarely in practice subject to rigorous
adversarial testing in a subsequent criminal adjudication. Where the sole witnesses to a stop are
the suspect and arresting officers, there is little reason to think the resulting testimonial contest
206
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will result in accurate outcomes. Police have a strong incentive to color the facts in their favor, or
even outright lie.211 A recent ethnographic account of the Chicago criminal courts, for example,
paints a bleak picture of judges acting “overtly racist ways in court, mocked defendant’s blacksounding names or used bastardized Ebonics to imitate the voices of defendants, families and
victim,” judges who routinely “laughed at the fabrication of police reports as if it were a novelty,
rather than an abuse of power.”212 Chicago’s pathologies might be extreme. But it is hard to
imagine such practices are wholly absent from other large metropolitan courts systems. In many
urban jurisdictions, therefore, there will be little effectual incentive for officers to comply with
Terry’s meager epistemic exhortation.
Nevertheless, the general trend in judicial reworkings of the Terry has been deflationary.
I will just give one example, as it happens one that is particularly relevant to SQF. Whereas the
Terry Court allowed the stop and frisk only when an office suspected crime was “afoot,”213
subsequent cases extended that power to instances in which a crime has been completed.214
While seemingly innocuous and sensible, this subtle shift in practice dramatically expands police
discretion. Under Terry, the constellation of facts that might be invoked to justify a stop was
bounded by what an officer could observe at a specific moment in time. Now, an officer can rely
on a far greater universe of historical facts, available through a police forces’ index of suspect
descriptions, to support reasonable articulable suspicion. In a handful of controversial cases,
descriptions identifying African-American suspects have been employed to conduct blanket
searches. In the controversial case of Brown v. City of Oneonta, for example, a description of a
black male suspect provoked Oneonta police to stop more than two hundred “non-white
persons,” including women, encountered on the streets.215 Even absent the broad search at issue
in Brown, a large enough pool of suspect descriptions (as is likely to be the case in large cities)
means that police discretion to stop becomes orders of magnitude larger than the authority
defined in Terry.216
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Subsequent refinements to the Terry regime have rendered SQF more attractive relative
to other ways of deploying policing resources. As the late William Stuntz noted, criminal
procedure rules can act as “subsidies … making some kinds of … law enforcement cheaper”
than others.217 Stuntz applied this logic to make a comparison between “policing street markets,”
which is “cheap,” for the police, and the more expensive regulation of indoor, upscale drug
markets.218 His point, though, can be extended to the neighborhood level.
For a parallel differential arises between neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and
areas of comparative wealth because of two Fourth Amendment precedents. First, the Court in
Illinois v. Wardlow held that mere presence in a “high crime neighborhood,” and more
particularly “an area of heavy narcotics trafficking” was “relevant” to the legality of a Terry
stop.219 Evidence from New York’s SQF practice also demonstrates that this term is “vulnerable
to subjective and highly contextualized interpretations.”220 This may be of particular concern to
the extent that an increasing proportion of minorities tends to create a belief of disorderliness and
criminality, as multiple studies show, 221 Wardlow creates an incentive to target minority
neighborhoods. Indeed, even setting aside the question of how a “high crime area” is to be
identified or bounded, Wardlow explicitly subsidizes police activity in neighborhoods of
concentrated poverty in comparison to wealthy neighborhoods.
Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Utah v. Streiff222 creates an incentive for
officers to target for stops populations likely to have a higher rate of bench warrants. In Streiff,
the arresting officer was conducting a stakeout of a house where drug sales were suspected to
happen. He saw Strieff leave the house and stopped him, despite lacking reasonable articulable
suspicion. Partly as a result of what the state conceded to be an illegal stop, the officer asked
Streiff for identification. Upon checking with his dispatcher, the officer learned of an outstanding
warrant for Streiff and arrested him. A search incident to arrest found methamphetamine and
drug paraphernalia.223 The issue before the Court was whether this evidence should be excluded
as fruit of the initial illegal stop. Writing for five Justices, Justice Thomas said no. Characterizing
the initial unlawful stop as “negligent” and a “good-faith” mistake,224 the Court found that the
search-incident-to-arrest that had produced the narcotics to be “sufficiently attenuated by the preexisting arrest warrant.”225 Hence, the evidence found during the search incident to arrest was not
subject to exclusion in Streiff’s criminal adjudication.226
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As Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed out, “[o]utstanding warrants are surprisingly
common.”227 A recent ethnography of misdemeanor courts in New York illustrates how courts
and prosecutors generate a large volume of outstanding warrants for failures to appear at
repeatedly rescheduled hearings, and then seek dispositions with little effect other than to
facilitate later arrests.228 In Streiff, Justice Sotomayor did not contextualize the use of outstanding
warrants in the SQF context. Rather, she cited evidence gathered by the Justice Department in
Ferguson, MO, and explained that the “astounding numbers of warrants can be used by police to
stop people without cause,” and flagged that “it is no secret that people of color are
disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny.”229 Police, indeed, have long been cognizant of
the strategic potential for outstanding warrant-checks during street stops and have strategically
exploited it.230
The decision in Streiff creates a new incentive for police to engage in “negligent”
stops, lacking even with the minimal accouterments of reasonable articulable suspicion, in
order to check for warrants. This incentive becomes more powerful as the expected number of
such outstanding warrants in a neighborhood increases. Here then is yet another incentive
pressing police to focus street patrols on neighborhoods of concentrated poverty: Even if they
cannot muster the minimal evidentiary predicate of Terry, officers have a sure-fire way of
showing ‘progress,’ simply by making illegal stops and arresting based on either outstanding
warrants or contraband found during a search incident to arrest. Streiff allows officers to employ
stops even absent Terry suspicion and demonstrate ‘success.’
231

Decisions such as Wardlow and Streiff mean that current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence systematically tilts in favor of SQF. The doctrinal framework at work in these
cases minimizes both proximate and distant harms to individuals stopped. It also ignores the
ecological harms and dynamic stratification effects associated with SQF. Indeed, it seems fair to
say that the vocabulary of the Fourth Amendment does not at present contain the resources even
to account for those harms, let alone hold them in the balance with Terry stops’ positive, crimecontrol effects. One indication of this is that Justice Sotomayor’s comments about the ecological
context of street policing were so striking, and so dissonant from the normative verbiage of the
Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, that they generated media attention.232 If the mere fact a
Justice is cognizant of the larger policy context in which a legal question arises stimulates the
chattering classes into action, it is because the modal Fourth Amendment decision is hermetically
detached from the distinctive ecological and dynamic costs flowing from urban policing.
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Nevertheless, that jurisprudence is not wholly bounded by a narrow, transactional focus.
Rather, the Court selectively and asymmetrically accounts for dynamic effects. Consider the
Streiff Court’s treatment of the exclusionary remedy. The Court’s foundational decisions about
the scope of that remedy focus on its effects on officers’ incentives. The Court has repeatedly
stressed that it is willing to allow the costly exclusionary remedy only when its downstream
incentive effects in relation to police compliance with the Fourth Amendment are substantial.233
Notionally acknowledging this point, the Streiff Court stated that only “purposeful or flagrant”
police misconduct can be deterred.234 Why this would be so is not clear. Tort liability for
negligence, for example, can easily be premised on a deterrence theory. In Streiff itself, the Court
gave no thought to the possibility that its rule might elicit less care by officers in their use of
Terry stops—let alone a differential impact in neighborhoods characterized by high rates of
outstanding or bench warrants.
Streiff suggests that the Court is willing to think about the dynamic effects of the
exclusionary rule on incentives when doing so narrows Fourth Amendment remedies, but is not
willing to entertain a dynamic analysis when doing so would expand those remedies.235 In other
cases, the Justices have similarly being willing to account for increases in police
professionalism.236 But judicial decisions on the exclusionary rule systematically ignore potential
institutional problems of police perjury and abusive conduct.
There is, in short, little reason to expect that the Court’s current Fourth Amendment
doctrine will provide a lens for capturing the distinctive wrong of SQF. Indeed to the extent it
nudges police conduct of urban street policing in one way or another, the Court has abetted the
core wrong of SQF more than it has ameliorated it. For this reason, it seems wiser to analyze
SQF in terms of its racial impact—a topic addressed at length below and in Part III.
B.

The Limits of Equal Protection Doctrine

The Supreme Court’s decisions on race and the Equal Protection Clause provide no better
traction on the distinctive wrongs of SQF. To the contrary, thinking about racial equality doctrine
through the lens of SQF illuminates a gap between the Court’s articulated justifications and its
current doctrinal forms. To take seriously the normative concerns I have flagged would mean
treating SQF as a paradigmatic Equal Protection violation.

233

See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (“Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law
enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.
The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.”); see also Messerschmidt v. Millender,
132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246 (2012) (reiterating Leon’s deterrence-based logic); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–
237 (2011) (same).
234
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
235
In a similar vein, David Sklansky has pointed out that the Court toggles without any principled basis between
rules and standards in Fourth Amendment case-law in ways that inure to the government’s benefit. David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 29498 (1997).
236
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (“Another development over the past half-century that deters
civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police
discipline.”).

- 34 -

Two core prohibitions are embodied in current Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
First, explicit racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, and require government to
“demonstrate with clarity” that its “‘purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and
substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary ... to the accomplishment of its
purpose.’”237 In the absence of an explicit racial classification,238 a government action motivated
by a “discriminatory purpose” with an adverse effect on a discrete protected class establishes an
Equal Protection Clause violation. But the Court’s gloss on discriminatory purpose, promulgated
in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, is cast in exacting terms. It compels
litigants to show that a state actor “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”239 In
contrast, a disparate impact on a racial group alone does nothing to impugn the constitutionality
of a state action.240
In the criminal justice context, this doctrinal framework leaves the state with a largely
free hand. At the Supreme Court, few Equal Protection case have arisen in the criminal justice
context. Only one recent case has grappled with a racial classification. In Johnson v. California,
a state prison used a racial classification to sort inmates temporarily before cell assignments
could be determined.241 The Court rejected the state’s call to derogate from strict scrutiny.242 In
contrast, the Court declined to grant certiorari in Brown v. City of Oneonta, a case that would
have required it to consider whether the Second Circuit had correctly held that a race-based
suspect description was not a “racial classification” subject to strict scrutiny.243
Under Feeney, there are a handful of cases in which prosecutorial use of preemptory
challenges is held to be racially motivated, and thus to violate the Equal Protection Clause.244
But cases involving more systemic challenges to the operation of the criminal justice institutions
have been wholly absent from the Court’s docket since the 1987 case of McClesky v. Kemp.245 In
large measure, this is because McCleskey established a near-insurmountable barrier to such
237
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challenges.246 In that capital case, the Court declined to infer discriminatory purpose from
unrebutted statistical evidence that Georgia’s capital punishment treated defendants differently
based on their race and the race of their victim.247 Among the reasons the Court offered for
declining to entertain even powerful statistical evidence, 248 it worried that “if we accepted
McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty,” including noncapital
sentencing.249 This concern about what Justice Brennan acerbically characterized as “a fear of too
much justice”250 reoccurs in other instances in which criminal justice disparities have been
challenged.251
After McCleskey, absent the miraculous happenstance of testimonial or documentary
evidence of bias—a luck that befell plaintiffs in the challenge to New York’s SQF policy252—the
courthouse door is effectively shut to discriminatory-purpose challenges in the criminal justice
context.253 McCleskey, in tandem with the narrow definition of “racial classifications” evinced by
the Court’s treatment of Johnson and Brown, drastically narrows litigants’ opportunities to
challenge the role of race in criminal justice institutions. They evince no concern for either the
246
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ecological spillovers of enforcement actions onto larger racial cohorts. And much like the Fourth
Amendment cases canvassed above, they are heedless of dynamic effects—except perhaps
maintaining a concern for maintaining the criminal-justice status quo. Finally, neither the rule
against racial classification nor the bar to discriminatory motivations takes into account the
possibility that officials are aware that a policy pursued for nonracial ends has a wholly
foreseeable spillover effects on other members of a racial or ethnic cohort,254 or the possibility
that race is so pervasively correlated with nonracial traits—such as residence, socioeconomic
status, and the like—that official decision-makers simply cannot disentangle racial from
nonracial criteria.255
But there is something of a puzzle here. In glossing the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court has invoked ideas of racial stigma,256 racial balkanization,257 and the dignitary interest in
being judged on one’s own merits.258 It is not hard to see that SQF, as described in Part I,
implicates each of these concerns. It is, most importantly, expressly predicated on an inference
from race to criminality.259 It is indeed explicitly defended on a generalization—a stereotype
about racial minorities that is not merely derogatory, but that has historically been a keystone of
discriminatory legal architectures. And its advocates make no bones that the price of public
safety will be borne disproportionately by only some, and only because of the color of their skin.
Further, it thrives upon the festering racial segregation that scars our cities. Worse, it reinforces
that segregation to the extent that minorities are subject to increased stops when they leave their
neighborhoods. Quite literally, it echoes and embeds the balkanization of our cities into black
and white quarters. And thanks to the weak evidentiary threshold of Terry, it enables police to
engage in aggregate deprivations of individual liberty that are predicated only fractionally on
individual behavior and largely on race and place. If one takes the Court’s justifications on face
value, policing tactics such as SQF, in short, ought to be the sine qua non of what the Equal
Protection Clause protects.
Equal Protection doctrine, in conclusion, provides the moral justifications but not the
doctrinal tools for dealing with SQF. It is beholden to the default narrow and atomistic
transactional frame of constitutional law, which shears away both ecological and dynamic
contexts. And ultimately, it lacks the courage of its putative convictions. For these reasons, it is
not an instrument fit for the task of fixing SQF.
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III.

The Disparate Impact Lens on SQF

This Part turns from critique to a more constructive proposal. Not all instruments to
mitigate moral wrongs have to reside in the Constitution. So I look elsewhere. I argue that a
disparate impact framework of liability, now found in federal statutes and state law, provides a
better—but not a perfect—framework for analyzing urban street-policing policy. The purpose of
the disparate impact lens advanced here is diagnostic and distinctly second-best: It is second best
in the sense that it does not track the loose cost-benefit analysis that is fleshed out in Part I: That
cost-benefit analysis, in my view, impugns all programmatic use of SQF in racially diverse cities
at present. More modestly, a disparate impact lens provides a way to identify a class of instances
in which a police department’s programmatic use of Terry stops is especially likely to be
unjustified because characterized by its distinctive ecological and dynamic harms. A disparate
impact lens, that is, flush out instance in which those harms are at an acme.
Formally, a disparate impact framework identifies a set of cases in which the likely
proximate costs of SQF are concentrated on minority communities without an adequately
supported justification. The analysis developed in Part II suggested that the proximate costs of
SQF—which include the hassle and humiliation of stops—are only a fraction of the total costs of
SQF. The latter comprise the larger set of dynamic costs to individuals, families and
communities. If the proximate costs of SQF are highly concentrated, it is likely that aggregate
costs are also extremely concentrated. Where the state cannot identify a strong public policy
justification for that concentration, SQF should be ranked as legally problematic. More
specifically, where the state cannot adequately make the case that the concentration of SQF
responds to a real crime problem, and in fact mitigates that problem, it should be required to
reconsider its policing strategy. In this sense, the avoidance of disparate impact is a modest,
second-best demand, which directs attention at the right elements of policing strategy.260 It
invites remedial attention to systemic rather than individualistic pathologies. And it avoids the
moralizing, and potentially polarizing, language of individual blame and liability.
To flesh out this alternative lens onto SQF, this Part defines and defends disparate impact
liability as a legally available approach for analyzing policing decisions. In particular, I develop
the reasons for which disparate impact is superior to the currently dominant constitutional
approaches described in Part II. Having dealt with potential objections to its translation to the
policing context, I conclude by sketching how in practice disparate impact liability can be
applied to SQF. In practice, a disparate impact analysis requires econometric studies of the
aggregate data about stops, frisks, and other outcomes. I set forth three general lines of inquiry
that should be applied to such aggregate data to determine whether a disparate impact exists.
Together, these empirical strategies provide a template for making disparate impact an effective
and practicable instrument of legal reform.
A.

The Availability of Disparate Impact

The theory of disparate impact liability in race discrimination cases is associated with the
Supreme Court’s construction of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v. Duke
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Power Company. 261 In a somewhat narrowed form, it remains available to plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases.262 Disparate impact is also a cognizable theory of liability
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act263 and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).264 It can
be understood as either an instrument for rooting out bad intent, or as a freestanding ground of
liability.265 Disparate impact is in contrast a ‘road not taken’ in Equal Protection law.266
Disparate impact in the policing context is available under two sets of laws. First, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “discrimination under any program or activity”
receiving federal funds.267 Pursuant to an explicit grant of rule-making authority under the
statute, federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, have promulgated regulations
prohibiting disparate racial impacts as well as disparate racial treatment. 268 The Justice
Department’s disparate-impact regulation applies to “any program for which Federal financial
assistance is authorized under a law administered by the Department.”269 Because local police
departments receive federal funding from “dozens” of separate programs, many administered by
the Department of Justice,270 the Title VI bar on disparate impact applies to most police forces.
That prohibition, however, may be enforced by public suits but not via private right of action.271
The New Orleans consent decree and the Baltimore settlement obtained by the Justice
Department, for example, both invoke Title VI authority, albeit in nebulous terms.272
Second, at least two states prohibit policing measures with disparate racial impacts. The
Illinois Civil Rights Act, tracking Title VI’s language and effect, prohibits “discrimination under
any program or activity on the grounds of that person’s race, color, national origin, or gender.”273
In at least one case, it has been applied to policing decisions.274 California’s law, which applies to
all state programs, prohibits “criteria or methods of administration that … have the purpose or
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effect of subjecting a person to discrimination on the basis of ethnic group identification,
religion, age, sex, color, or a physical or mental disability.”275
Disparate impact is commonly framed as a three-step analysis. In the employmentdiscrimination context, a prima facie case is established by showing that a specific employer
practice caused racial disparities in a salient outcome measure.276 A racial disparity is measured
by comparing employment rates in an employer’s workforce with the qualified labor pool277 or
the applicant pool,278 rather than to the general population. Agencies interpreting Title VII have
long used a four-fifth rule to single out cognizable disparities.279 The Court has approving cited
this interpretation, adding that a simple “significant statistical disparity, and nothing more” is
needed at the threshold.280 This prima facie case, however, may be rebutted by evidence that “the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.”281 This defense, however, is overcome if there is a legitimate alternative employment
practice that will result in less discrimination.282
B.

The Comparative Advantage of Disparate Impact

Black-letter constitutional law largely ignores the ecological and dynamic aspects of
SQF. It therefore fails to provide a useful analytic lens for determining when and how urban
street policing goes off the rails. Why would a disparate impact lens do any better? It is not a
form of cost-benefit analysis of the kind developed above, after all. Rather, disparate impact
isolates the proximate costs of a policy (excluding, that is, its social, familial, and
intergenerational effects) and compares to the affirmative policy justifications. In the policing
context, disparate impact thus weighs a subcategory of the costs imposed on minority
populations against almost all the crime-control related benefits of the policy. Given its failure to
capture the full range of costs adumbrated in Part II, and given that it will likely account for most
of the benefits of SQF, a disparate impact lens is likely to be radically underinclusive: It will
only capture a subset of cases in which SQF imposes a moral wrong.
275
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Nevertheless, there are three reasons for thinking that disparate impact is a better fit for
identifying the distinctive moral wrong of SQF identified in Part I. First, disparate impact
liability is at least focused on aggregate, rather than individual, outcomes. It is panoramic rather
than microscopic. The institutional focus of disparate impact widens the array of relevant
institutional decisions that can be considered as causes of harm. Policing is not simply a matter
of officers on the street, making ad hoc decisions. Like any other complex organizations, a police
force is channeled through policies, practices, and bureaucratic norms developed at competing
institutional nodes, from city hall to chief of police’s office to the precinct-house. The capacious
lens used by disparate impact captures more relevant state actions than an approach focused on
bad motives.
Analysis under a wide-angle disparate impact rubric is also not limited to the
consequences of a discrete individual’s action. It focuses more capaciously on all “the effects of
[a] … practice.”283 SQF, as I have described it in Part I, need not rest on pernicious individual
motivations to do a distinctive moral wrong. Rather, that wrong flows from the “effects” of
institutional policies and practices. Disparate impact is sensitive to a wide range of effects, and is
in particular able to capture the interaction between past distributions and present policing
practice. An institutional practice, such as SQF, will produce different effects depending on the
context to which is applied. When employed in a fashion that tracks patterns of existing racial
segregation, its race-related patterns will be different from an application that cuts across extant
forms of racial stratification. This difference is captured in the broad scope of disparate impact
analysis, which accounts for history, as well as institutional context, in a way that discriminatory
treatment analysis cannot.
Second, disparate impact analysis focuses attention on the morally relevant question of
whether the crime-control benefits of the policy as a whole justify its costs. Once a racial effect
is identified at the threshold step, the second step of the disparate-impact analysis involves a
consideration of the affirmative justifications for the disparity. In effect, the analysis weighs
positives against negatives. In the discriminatory treatment context, by contrast, there is no
opportunity to identify or weigh these costs. As a result, when a race-based criteria is used, as in
Brown v. City of Oneonta,284 a Court inclined to permit race-based suspect descriptions as costjustified will find it easier to avoid strict scrutiny by declining to perceive a racial classification
at work in the first instance.285 On the other side of the ledger, disparate-impact analysis also
considers the aggregate outcomes of a policy. In the SQF context, for example, this would mean
counts of the numbers of different racial groups who are stopped. Again, it is important to
emphasize that this is not a full tally of the ecological and dynamic spillovers from aggressive
SQF policing. But it accounts for of the policy’s sheer size—and hence reflects (very
approximately) the effect of a large number of minority stops on self-worth, residential patterns,
and stereotypical assumptions about the links between race and crime far better than a legal
framework pinched to fit cleanly around individual motives.
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Finally, disparate impact liability obviates the need to make controversial judgments
about individuals’ intentions, beliefs, and attitudes. By focusing attention on these elusive
psychological facts, both Terry and Feeney invite self-deception and perjury. The Feeney
framework in particular also ratchets up emotional stakes by predicating a remedy on the finding
that a specific person is motivated by discriminatory intent, a standard that has the potential to
induce backlash. 286 By training upon consequentialist criteria instead, the disparate impact
standard obviates loaded, and easily deflected, allegations of bad intent, even as it draws salutary
attention to the deeper and more enduring costs of SQF.
To be clear, no judicially enforceable theory of liability will provide a panacea to the
problem of concentrated racialized poverty, or the complex network of state action and inaction
that created and perpetuated it. The case for disparate impact liability in the policing context rests
on the more modest claim that it captures a wider array of morally relevant costs and benefits
than the available alternatives. It does not imply perfection.
C.

The Objections to Disparate Impact in the Policing Context

Three objections to the application of disparate impact liability to the policing context are
worth resolving before turning to the nitty-gritty of application. They concern its
constitutionality, its efficacy, and the availability of popular support.
To begin with, there has recently been a question about the constitutionality of disparate
impact liability, even though in its infancy in the 1970s it was understood as an important strand
of Equal Protection law.287 Paradoxically, at least one member of the Court has intimated that
disparate impact might itself violate the Equal Protection Clause because it forces race
consciousness.288 Nevertheless, more recent precedent suggests that there is “no constitutional
problem in the existence of disparate impact prohibitions,” but that “those prohibitions might
raise such problems in their application.”289 In particular, the Court has suggested that the second
step of the analysis—the proffer of legitimate justifications for a disparity—is key.
In glossing the FHA’s disparate impact prong, the Court in its 2015 Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project opinion cautioned that
constitutional problems would arise if “liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a
statistical disparity.”290 Rather, it is only “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that
286
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legitimately and constitutionally trigger such liability. 291 This places great stress on the
opportunity for a defendant in a disparate impact proceeding to point to “[non-]arbitrary” and
“[]necessary” grounds for a justification.292 More specifically, a regression analysis used to
identify a race effect must include controls for legitimate justifications for a disparity.293
A second concern raised by a number of recent commentators is that “the disparate
impact theory has produced no substantial social change and there is no reason to think that
extending the theory to other contexts would have produced meaningful reform.”294 A common
thread uniting these concerns is the premise that courts are unwilling to “broadly restructure
social institutions”295 or interfere with the private intra-firm ordering.296
To be sure, the frailty of the judicial will to enforce constitutional norms on behalf of
disfavored groups can almost never be overstated. Nevertheless, blanket pessimism is excessive
for two reasons. To begin with, several cities are already operating under consent decrees or
settlements that either include a monitor or envisage much judicially supervised reorganization
of street policing.297 Further, there is no reason to think that municipal officials involved in the
negotiation and operationalizing of these deals lack any interest in mitigating the fierce public
pressure to diminish the racial tensions of urban policing. The application of disparate impact
liability provides a more cogent way for them to understand how to do so than available
alternatives. In addition, precise agency regulations, such as those issued in 2015 under the FHA,
have the potential “to stabilize disparate impact law and to provide clarity to regulated entities
subject to different judicial standards.” 298 There is no reason such stabilization cannot be
achieved in the policing context through more specific Justice Department regulations. Indeed,
the more granular account of how to think about disparate impact in the context of policing data
that follows in Part III.C itself can be read as providing a framework for such regulations.
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Finally, it might be argued that broad support for aggressive street policing within
minority communities provides a sufficient justification for racially disparate allocation of Terry
stops.299 If the very communities that suffer the costs of intensive policing also clamor for such
policing, the moral case for disparate impact liability seems thin indeed. Yet evidence for
community demand in the context of SQF is thin on the ground. Protests in Chicago, New York,
and Philadelphia about stop and protest have been led by organizations from minority
communities. 300 More generally, to the extent that African-American political leaders have
sought increased policing, there have been “accompanying demands to redirect power and
economic resources to low-income minority communities.”301 But “[w]hen blacks ask for better
policing, legislators tend to hear more instead.”302 Disparate impact liability is more sensitive to
the marginal crime-control costs benefits attached to SQF, as well as its costs. It is therefore a
sensible way to reconcile minority communities’ demands for both better public security and
also freedom for excessive street policing cannot.
D.

Disparate Impact In Action

This final section sketches how a disparate impact analysis of SQF data might be put into
action. Its twofold aim is to show that such inquiries are feasible, and to start to make progress
on some of the knotty theoretical puzzles raised by disparate impact’s implementation. I focus on
a threshold question. The settlements in Philadelphia and Chicago, which were both reached
without information-generating litigation, require collection of extensive data concerning the
timing, justifications, suspect demographics, and consequences of stops.303 How might this data
be interrogated for evidence of disparate impact? How concretely, that is, is it possible to inquiry
into whether a discrete practice or policy causes a racially disparate impact that is not justified on
legitimate and necessary grounds be executed? In answering these questions, I focus on the
theoretical questions of what kinds of disparities should count, not more technical questions of
econometric identification strategy.
A disparate racial impact can result from one of three elements of policing strategy. Each
warrants separate and distinct analysis. At each level, racial disparities salient to the distinctive
moral wrong of SQF can emerge. And at each level, the state can also avail itself of different
legitimate justifications for the disparity. If anything, the feasible analytic tools favor the state.
Disparate impact, in the fashion developed here, is likely underinclusive insofar as it does not
capture all the ecological and dynamic externalities from SQF. The availability of plural tests to
capture a racially disparate effect only partially compensate for this lacuna. Nevertheless, it is the
299
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extant doctrinal framework for the problem, and likely superior to anything that can be created
from scratch in current political conditions.
For the purpose of illustration here, I hypothesize a municipal jurisdiction that has just
entered a consent decree. We can assume that like New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, this
municipality is racially and economically segregated, with race and socioeconomic status closely
covarying. We can also assume that the city is sliced into precincts, which are the foundational
elements of the geographic allocation of police. The municipality’s SQF, as in real-life cases, is
directed at neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and high crime—which are also majority
minority. The municipality is required to gather data about stops of the kind elicited by the
Chicago and Philadelphia settlements. I will assume police collect that data faithfully.304 I focus
here on the legal question of what questions can be asked of the resulting data.
I discuss each three levels of analysis in turn. Each time, I identify the relevant element of
state policy or practice; the outcome across which racial disparities may be observed; and the
range of feasible justifications a municipality might offer. Where possible, I also note if the
question has been examined in an existing study or litigation.
1.

Between Precinct Disparities

The first level of analysis that should be tested is the rate of SQF deployment by precinct.
Recall that the core justification for SQF tendered by its defenders is that street police are
deployed where crime occurs; racial disparities arise only because crime is concentrated in
minority neighborhoods.305 But this may not be the case. Perceptions of crime can also be a
function of the racial composition of a neighborhood.306 A threshold policy decision to be tested
is the volume of Terry stop per precinct with a lagged measure of crime as a control as a way of
determining whether the geographical distribution of policing resources turns on racial
demographics or crime rates.307
For example, Jeffrey Fagan tested whether the number of stops per precinct in New York
City was disproportionate to the racial composition of the precinct, after controlling for several
different types of historical crime rate, revealed that the crime-based justification for SQF’s
allocation was unfounded.308 Using an ordinary least squares regression, he found that the
percentage of African-American residents was a stronger predictor of Terry stop volume than
lagged rates of violent crime, narcotics offices, weapons offenses and trespass.309 Only property
304
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and quality-of-life rates outperformed race as predictors of stop volume.310 This is an especially
striking result given SQF’s justification in the Kansas City Experiment as a means of reducing
violent crime, and as an alternative to broken windows policing.311
It is also striking because the assumption that an increase in crime rates should predict a
subsequent increase in street stops is a dubious that stacks the deck in the state’s favor in a
normative troubling way. More specifically, the use of lagged crime rates as a control assumes
that the only available, or perhaps the best available, policing response to upticks in crime
concern is more intensive street policing. But this is false.312 As I have argued, the evidence that
SQF has a large crime-control effect is weak, especially in comparison to alternative policing
instruments.313 The use of crime rates as a baseline further assumes that Terry stops are
responsive to all kinds of violent crime. At least for the proportion of violent crimes that occur
within the home against partners or other intimates, it is hard to see how Terry stops respond to
those problems.314 In short, there is no good reason to assume the best, only, or most effective
response to rising crime rates in a specific neighborhood is to up the number of people being
stopped.315
A between-precinct measure of racial disparities can be combined with a range of other
measures to develop a more nuanced understanding of how policing resources are allocated
across geographic areas. Hence, simple descriptive statistics can provide useful confirmatory
evidence, even if they are cannot on their own prove disparate-impact liability under Inclusive
Communities. 316 The data might be further interrogated by comparing the determinants of
precinct-level deployments with the rate of stops per resident, conditional on racial identity.317
Where such citywide tests find that not only do minority neighborhoods bear a disproportionate
toll of stops, but minority individuals also bear a larger share of those stops, there is reason for
concern that SQF is not only regressive in effect, but also triggers the dynamic, vicious-circle
processes described in Part I.C. In addition, the between-precinct distribution of street policing is
usefully contrast with the distribution of other policing resources. If precincts that receive
intensive Terry treatments, for example, are associated with lower rates of other policing
measures—e.g., they have fewer officers deployed across both reactive and proactive policing, or
they have persistently longer wait times for 911 calls—then there is further reason for skepticism
that crime control simplicter in fact elucidates racial disparities across geographic subunits
within the municipality.
310
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2.

Within-Precinct Disparities

The next level of analysis focuses on the distribution of Terry stops by racial or ethnic
group within a precinct. Between-precinct tests are incomplete because even if there are no
between-precinct disparities, a disparate racial impact might emerge within a given precinct
because racial minorities engaged in the same (potentially criminal) conduct as non-minorities
are more likely, holding all else constant, to be stopped or otherwise policed than non-minorities.
The intuition that racial minorities may be overpoliced in comparison to similar nonminority citizens is easy to see in the context of racially heterogeneous central business districts,
where minority citizens may be perceived as categorically out of place and hence suspicious. But
the same disparity can arise even in poorer, majority-minority neighborhoods. A pair of studies
of narcotics policing in Seattle by Katherine Beckett and her colleagues nicely illustrate how race
might figure in within-precinct dynamics in this way. Their first study demonstrated (among
other things) that in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, three percent of those purchasing
narcotics were African-American, while 20.5 percent of those arrested were AfricanAmerican.318 Their second study found that predominantly white outdoor drugs markets received
“far less attention” from police than racially diverse ones, such that the “geographic
concentration of law enforcement resources [was] a significant cause of racial disparity.”319
Indeed, a qualitative component of the study found that police officers flagged one racially
diverse crack market while failing to mention an “overwhelmingly white” market for
prescription drugs operating alongside it.320 Beckett and her collaborators explicitly consider the
possibility that differences in the policing of crack cocaine and prescription drug markets may be
due to different levels of associated violence. They find, however, that the association between
crack and violence “does not appear to have existed in Seattle during the period under study.”321
These Beckett studies’ findings echo sociological findings of how racial composition predict
perceptions of crime, and historical findings about the deep roots of stereotypes of black
criminality. They demonstrate the importance of a nuanced and contextualized analysis of what
is happening within heavily policed neighborhoods, rather than a blasé assumption that heavy
policing in high-crime neighborhoods is necessarily even-handed or efficacious.
A within-precinct analysis usefully considers whether the rate of minority stops is better
predicted by legitimate policing grounds or suspects’ race, conditional on certain precinct level
characteristics. Within a pool of stop-related data, the number of stops per ethnic group within a
given time period would be the outcome variable (i.e., dependent variable) to be explained.322
For a given precinct, one could ask whether there is a statistically significant correlation between
the rate of stops and the fact individual suspects are African-American or Hispanic rather than
white, controlling for certain precinct-level characteristics. Some existing studies deploy a
method called multilevel modeling to control simultaneously for individual and precinct-level
318
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factors.323 I will assume that approach is valid, although nothing rests on that assumption so long
as some other econometric technique is available.
The pivotal question for such multilevel models is the choice of control variables to
capture “[non-]arbitrary” and “[]necessary” justifications.324 A disparate impact model should
include only control variables that provide normatively valid justifications for a within-precinct
racial disparity. In this regard, it is fundamentally dissimilar from tests for discriminatory
motives. A regression-based test for the latter operates by excluding all possible explanations for
a stop except for the race of a suspect. The study employed in the New York litigation, for
example, controls for the foreign-born proportion of a precinct; socioeconomic status, and the
presence of a business district.325 But a racial disparate impact, as a matter of law, arises not only
when there is no other possible explanation for a racial gap in stop rates. It also arises when there
is no legitimate explanation related to policing goals for that gap. In this regard, the economic
analysis of disparate impacts is unlike the large array of econometric studies that focus on a
“causal if-then question” and treat randomized trials as an “ideal.”326 Variables such as the
socioeconomic character of a precinct, its foreign-born populace, and officer race have no place
in disparate-impact analysis.327 Their inclusion leads to “included variable bias” insofar as they
“would not plausibly justify a racial disparity in outcomes.”328 Even when included in disparate
treatment analyses, they result in “bloated statistical models so chock-full of covariates (i.e.,
control variables) that any evidence of disparate treatment disappears.”329
In several existing studies, lagged crime rates are used as the baseline control in this sort
of multilevel model.330 This parameter at least relates directly to the best justification that a
municipality has for increased street stops—i.e., crime-related patterns—subject to the concerns
raised above.331 It captures the ways in which deployment levels might fluctuate in respond to
shifts in the geographic distribution of crime. It is also superior to a benchmark of lagged arrest
rates, which is employed in some models.332 The latter are potentially influenced by officers’
racial beliefs. Hence, a recent metastudy of effect of suspect race on arrest decisions found that

323

Multilevel modeling describes a school of approaches for including both micro- and macro-level factors in the
same equation to explain a single dependent variable. Thomas A. DiPrete & Jerry D. Forristal, Multilevel Models:
Method and Substance, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 331, 332-33 (1994).
324
See supra text accompanying notes 291 to 292.
325
Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 42, tbl. 7; Ayres & Borowsky, supra note 317, at 37-38, tbl. 7.
326
JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S
COMPANION 11-12 (2009). For this reason, the propensity score matching models used in some policing studies are
not suitable for disparate impact analysis. See Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 97-100 (noting and criticizing the use
of such models elsewhere).
327
The racial composition of a precinct is a relevant control if it proxies for the expected composition of persons on
the street—as assumption that will not hold in downtowns or transit hubs.
328
Ayres & Borowsky, supra note 317, at 13; see also Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of
“Included Variable Bias” 3-4 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/ayresincludedvariablebias.pdf.
329
Oakland report, supra note 25, at 6.
330
See Fagan Report, supra note 48, at 42; Ayres & Borowsky, supra note 317, at 34. Possible variant on these
report’s approaches is lagged rates of gun crime, which bear on the violent-crime related justification at times
offered for SQF.
331
See supra text accompanying notes 312 to 314.
332
See Gelman, Fagan & Kiss, supra note 47, at 817-18.

- 48 -

minorities are at least 30 percent more likely to be arrested as similar nonminority suspects.333
Historical arrest rates thus provide a distorted baseline, which obscures potential racial
disparities in stops by implicitly controlling for officer bias.
It is worth underscoring once more that the racial composition of the pool of those
suspected of a crime, or arrested for a crime is by no means an unproblematic benchmark for the
racial composition of those subject to a Terry stop even within a particular neighborhood. The
best argument from using such data as a benchmark, in my view, focuses solely on racial
composition of the local violent offender population. It hypothesizes that police focus either on
people or places associated with higher violent crime risk. Given racial segregation and racial
divides between social groups, it is then predicted that the racial composition of the stopped
population will track that of the at-risk population.
Setting aside questions about the efficacy of SQF generally as a crime-control measure,
there are nonetheless three reasons for skepticism of this logic. First, this logic assumes that
municipalities can accurately zero in on not just places but persons who present a risk of
violence. It is not clear that this is so. A recent study of Chicago’s Strategic Subjects List, for
example, found that individuals on the city’s list were no more or less likely to be victimized by
violence than a control group.334
Second, if SQF focuses on places rather than persons, the number of individuals involved
in violent crime is generally a tiny fraction of the volume of people stopped. 335 In the
exceptionally bloody month of August 2016 in Chicago, for example, 90 people were killed by
gunfire.336 The number of stops that month was likely at least two orders of magnitude greater.
Even assuming that the Chicago police in that month were focused accurately on corners where
violence was likely to occur, more than 100 instances of reasonable articulable suspicion were
being targeted for every one act of violence. Even if police then have reason to anticipate a
particular corner or street will witness violence, at a minimum some 99 out of every 100 stops
will have no relation to that violence. Historical patterns of violence cannot explain why
reasonable articulable suspicion existed for those individuals. The racial demographics of violent
crimes or violent crime-related arrests on a given street or corner do not in any meaningful sense
predict the racial distribution of reasonable articulable suspicion that police can witness at any
given moment in time. For most stops, most of the time, therefore, historical crime rates are
irrelevant to the incidence of a Terry stop.
Finally, imagine a municipality that affirmatively directs its police to engage in a pattern
of stops that mimics the racial distribution of violent crime offenders. In many contexts, that
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distribution will skew heavily towards African-Americans (and to a lesser extent Latinos). This
is, in effect a system of racial quotas where some 99 out of 100 of those subject to state coercion
suffer that fate based solely on their race rather than their own past conduct. Especially given the
weak empirical support for SQF’s efficacy, such a policy raises stark Equal Protection concerns
even under the Supreme Court’s current highly restrictive view of the doctrine.337
Instead of using crime rates, violent crime rates, or analogous arrest rates as a benchmark
of just policing, therefore, a study of disparate impact would ideally track Beckett and
colleagues’ Seattle study in estimating the racial composition of the baseline population subject
to police action through ethnographic observation (of open-air drug markets) and other means.338
Ideally, that is, data would be sampled, perhaps from police body-cameras, to estimate the racial
composition of the population observed on patrol for whom reasonable articulable suspicion
obtained. If, like police in Beckett’s studies, officers tended to ignore non-minority offenders
while stopping minority offenders, a within-precinct disparity would be established with
certainty. Such an approach is hardly impossible. Indeed, a recent study of Oakland policing
used text analysis of sound recordings from officers’ body-cameras to identify differential racial
treatment.339
3.

Within- and Between Officer Disparities

Finally, disparities can emerge not only at the aggregate levels of between- and withinprecincts. 340 They can also arise either because some (or all) officers within a precinct
differentiate between minority and nonminority suspects without a legitimate justification. This
level of police action—which comprises the dispersed exercise of individual officers’
discretion—demands attention to the sequence of distinct police actions embedded within a
particular interaction, ranging from the decision to stop, the decision to frisk, the use of force,
and the imposition of subsequent consequences such as citations or arrests. Given the existence
of outstanding warrants as a reason for arrests, however, the latter are a particularly tricky
variable to analyze because they may be unrelated to the initial stop. I sketch here the most
promising approaches for identifying racial disparities at the individual offer level. I then caution
against the use of the most popular economic model of police stops, commonly known as the
KPT model, as neither apposite nor realistic as a framework for analyzing SQF.
Individual officers might create racially disparate effects in two ways. First, the Terry
standard of reasonable articulable suspicion is a vague term with a range of possible
calibrations.341 Some or all officers might apply stronger or weaker evidentiary predicates for
stops of different racial groups. Second, as Fryer’s powerful analysis of New York policing
demonstrates, officers might differentially treat minorities who have been stopped by employing
a greater quantum of violence. Other outcomes, such as citations and arrests, might also be
disparately allocated. Disparities in both stop rates and post-stop outcomes should be analyzed in
a disparate-impact analysis.
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On the stop-rate question, a simple measure is to rerun the multilevel models used for
within-precinct disparities using officers rather than precincts as the relevant unit of analysis and
lagged crime rates (measured at the smallest available geographic unit) as a control.342 A parallel
analysis can be run for outcomes, such as the seizure of contraband or firearms.343 Again,
included variable bias would result if controls other than legitimate policing justification (such as
the lagged-crime-rate measure) were included.
Alternatively, a more novel approach involves the use of the “stop-level hit rate”
(“SHR”) or the ex ante probability of discovering contraband or a weapon based on what an
officer knows before a stop.344 Focusing on weapons-related stops, Goel and colleagues first use
two years’ worth of historical stop forms to calculate the actual probability of finding a weapon
for various combinations of factors listed on stop forms as the basis of ‘reasonable articulable
suspicion’ (along with location, timing, and local hit-rate data).345 This enables them to calculate
the distribution of ex ante probabilities of finding weapons for minorities and nonminorities, both
in general and holding location constant.346 In effect, by comparing the distribution of SHRs for
blacks and whites, they show that the effective quantum of reasonable articulable suspicion for
minorities is lower than that used for nonminorities.347 The same analysis might be executed by
precinct or by officer to determine if racial disparities are either geographically concentrated or
the work of a small fraction of officers.
Finally, the economics literature is dominated by a model by John Knowles, Nicola
Persico and Petra Todd known as the KPT model.348 In capsule form, KPT is a game-theoretical
model of traffic stops in which police seek to maximize arrests and both black and white
motorists maximize contraband. Police observe race. Both they and motorists strategically
anticipate the other’s actions. KPT predicts a Nash equilibrium in which blacks and whites are
stopped at different rates, while the probability of finding contrabands (i.e., the hit rate) across
groups is equal. The force of the model is to show how what at first seems a racial disparity—
unequal stop rates—is in fact explained by dynamic strategic action by both police and
motorists. 349 As a correlative, differences in hit rates provide evidence of taste-based
discrimination.
For several reasons, the KPT model is not well-suited to identify the core wrong of
racially disparate policing. To begin with, KPT is “informative only about bias in searches, not in
stops.”350 It is also a model for detecting taste-based discrimination, or animus, rather than the
use of race as an accurate generalization or the disparate racial impact of another factor (e.g.,
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socioeconomic status).351 Stated otherwise, it ignores all negative externalities from race-based
policing. 352 Even in this more limited compass, its core equilibrium concept rests on the
questionable assumption that police and motorists’ know of, and dynamically adapt to, each
other’s behavior.353 Extensions of their work that vary the models show that equal hit rates might
also be consistent with racial animus.354 Because the modeling assumptions of KPT are so
controversial, and its implications so fragile, it does not provide a useful lens even for the limited
question of whether there is animus-based searches.
*

*

*

This Part has aimed to demonstrate that a disparate-impact lens on SQF is constitutional,
legally available, and practicable. To that end, it has both articulated its legal basis and sketched
its practical operation. That kernel of analytic methods, I hope, can provide a catalyst for more
ambitious and innovation exploration of the ecological and dynamic manifestations of racial
disparities from SQF that, to date, remain in the empirical shadows.
Conclusion
Aggressive deployment of Terry stops has been a point of friction between urban police
and impoverished minority communities for more than fifty years. We are in a moment at which
a measure of reform appears politically feasible—or so the recent spate of settlements and
consent decrees might suggest. 355 Without a clear account of why and when aggressive
deployment of Terry stops can be a moral wrong, we will not have a clear sense of when or how
we might deploy law to remedy it.
This Article has aimed to specify the distinctive moral wrong of SQF and to demonstrate
that the law does have resources to identify it. My central claim has been that a disparate impact
lens, applicable to police pursuant to Title VI and state law, provides a better vantage point than
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black-letter constitutional law. By demonstrating that a disparate impact lens is constitutional,
potent, and practicable in terms of its implementation, I hope to begin a new conversation about
the role that law and courts can play in resolving the aching sore that is minority-police relations
in America’s cities today.
What I have offered here, though, is emphatically only the beginning of that story: The
law, I have shown, can be used to identify instances in which street policing plays a role in
perpetuating and deepening racial and social stratification. Once identified, dysfunctional
policing must be remedied through political pressure and legal injunctions that will vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There is no universal panacea. Police reform, moreover, is only one
element of a larger necessary program of social reform necessary to dislodge the persistence of
racialized concentrated poverty. Police do not create ghettos, and getting policing right will not
dissolve ghettos overnight. Nevertheless, doing so is a necessary component of rectifying an
important historical blight on our cities.
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